The Structure of Punishment Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model by Jacoby, Joseph E. & Cullen, Francis T.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 89
Issue 1 Fall Article 5
Fall 1998




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Joseph E. Jacoby, Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 245 (1998-1999)
0091-4169/98/8901-0245
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 89, No. 1
Copyright 0 1999 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printud in USA.
THE STRUCTURE OF PUNISHMENT
NORMS: APPLYING THE ROSSI-BERK
MODEL
JOSEPH E. JACOBY* & FRANCIS T. CUL"EN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades research on the nature of public
attitudes toward crime and punishment has grown substantially.1
Much of this research has been descriptive, reporting "what the
public thinks" about various crime-related issues. When con-
ceptual frameworks are used to explore the organizing princi-
ples of public opinion, they are largely dominated by the
ongoing debate between consensus and conflict theory.2 Re-
searchers typically comment on the implications of their find-
ings for this debate: Do citizens fundamentally agree or disagree
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Bowling Green State University
" Distinguished Research Professor, Division of CriminalJustice, University of Cin-
cinnati
I See generallyJulian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and CriminalJustice, in CRIME
ANDJUSrTcE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992); LorettaJ. Stalans &
ArthurJ. Lurigio, Editors' Introduction, Public Opinion About the Creation, Enforcement,
and Punishment of Criminal Offenses, 39 AM. BEHAvIORAL SCIENTIST 369 (1996); Mark
Warr, Public Perceptions and Reactions to Volent Offending and Victimization, in 4
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL 1 (Albert J.
Reiss, Jr. &Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1995) [hereinafter Warr, Public Perceptions].
2 As is well known, consensus theory argues that there is widespread agreement in
society about what should or should not be illegal. Laws and legal sanctions are thus
seen as reflecting the "will of the people." In contrast, conflict theory contends that
groups in society, based on competing political and/or economic interests, differ in
their views of what should be declared illegal and of what penalties lawbreaking
should elicit. Accordingly, laws and legal sanctions are seen as reflecting the ability of
competing groups to exercise power and have their interests represented in the
criminal law and in the administration of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Charles
W. Thomas et al., Public Opinion on Criminal Law and Legal Sanctions: An Examination of
Two Conceptual Models, 67J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 110 (1976); Mark Warr et al.,
Contending Theories of Criminal Law: Statutory Penalties Versus Public Preferences, 19 J. RES.
CRIME & DEIuNQ. 25 (1982) [hereinafter Warr et al., Contending Theories].
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on the rules that should govern society? Findings of attitudinal
agreement or consensus about the seriousness of crime or ap-
propriate punishments for offenders are taken as evidence in
favor of consensus theory; cleavages in opinion between social
groups-especially along race and class lines-are taken as sup-
port for conflict theory. Only rarely, however, do researchers
test a full range of hypotheses systematically derived from these
competing theories.
Although this body of research has value, the dominance of
the consensus/conflict debate may have stifled the development
of alternative approaches to examining crime attitudes. It is in-
structive that the empirical studies attempting to resolve
whether consensus or conflict best describes a normative do-
main typically produce ambiguous results.8 Researchers seldom
find either universal normative consensus or consensus clearly
differentiated by interest group membership. Instead they find
variation-more intra-individual variation than supports con-
sensus theory and less intra-group variation than supports con-
flict theory.
It is possible that the "ambiguous" findings of analysis ori-
ented around the consensus/conflict debate are a consequence
of the limited vision of both perspectives. The patterns of
norms that exist in the real world are not "ambiguous," though
they are not explained adequately by either of the dominant
perspectives. These perspectives may oversimplify the range of
potential normative structures (i.e., normative structures may
exist outside the types that are logically derived from either con-
sensus or conflict theory).
Accordingly, we suggest that criminologists studying the
structure of crime attitudes should move beyond consensus and
conflict theories as guides for their research by employing more
comprehensive, sophisticated models. To this end, we use an
" See, e.g., Stalans & Lurigio, supra note 1 (Stalans and Lurigio cite evidence and
arguments that support both the conflict and consensus models. In support of the
consensus model, they cite numerous studies revealing public consensus around
which behaviors are harmful and wrong, as well as widespread public support for the
courts and police. In support of the conflict model they site the sharp division along
racial lines of the justice of the verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial.)
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analytical model introduced by Peter Rossi and Richard Berk.4
The Rossi-Berk model offers a general sociological approach to
investigating and mapping normative structures. We apply this
model to data gathered through a national survey of public atti-
tudes toward the punishment of street crimes.
The Rossi-Berk model, which is described in detail below,
has advantages over both consensus and conflict theory as a
guide to exploring normative structures:
1. The Rossi-Berk model is rooted in empirical observation,
not ideology. Unlike both consensus and conflict theories, the
Rossi-Berk model's validity does not depend on whether con-
sensus or dissensus exists in any normative domain. Scholars
embracing either of these competing theories, having a stake in
finding or not finding consensus in public attitudes, must treat
findings anomalous to their paradigm as somehow not reflect-
ing reality. Consensus theorists dismiss inconsistencies between
public opinion and public policy as products of misinformation
caused by the entertainment media.5 Conflict theorists dismiss
evidence of widespread public agreement on some issues, assert-
ing that survey respondents who express attitudes divergent
from their "class interests" are exhibiting "false consciousness."
Though the existence of false consciousness may be impossible
to test empirically, it is an effective rhetorical response to evi-
dence that challenges the validity of the conflict model.
2. The purpose of the Rossi-Berk model is to provide a
comprehensive tool that may be used to determine whether
norms exist and what those norms are in any normative domain.
Consensus theory, which is rooted in the sociological theory of
structural-functionalism, has little to say about normative do-
mains that are not clearly connected to common interests that
contribute to the survival of the society; conflict theory has little
to say about normative domains that are not clearly related to
4 Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, Varieties of Normative Consensius, 50 AM. Soc.
REV. 333, 333-47 (1985) [hereinafter Rossi & Berk, Varieties]; Peter H. Rossi & Richard
A. Berk, A Conceptual Framework for Measuring Norms, in THE SOCIAL FABRic:
DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES 77 (James F. Short, Jr. ed., 1986) [hereinafter Rossi & Berk,
ConceptualFramework].
' Stalans & Lurigio, supra note 1, at 370.
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groups' political interests. Many normative domains, appar-
ently, do not lend themselves to either consensus or conflict
analysis because they are unrelated to either society's survival or
groups' political interests.6
3. The Rossi-Berk model is designed to deal with the full
spectrum of variability of normative judgments-from absolute
consensus to absolute dissensus-wherever it exists-within in-
dividuals, between individuals in the same group, and between
groups of individuals. The model covers the entire range of
logically possible normative structures. Neither consensus nor
conflict theory predicts the wide variety of patterns of public
opinion that actually exist.
4. The Rossi-Berk model is "comfortable" with the contin-
uum of consensus-dissensus that occurs in the real world. Un-
like both consensus and conflict theory, the Rossi-Berk model
does not require the arbitrary creation of dichotomous catego-
ries labeled "consensus" and "dissensus."
5. Neither consensus nor conflict theory suggests any par-
ticular methods for testing its validity. The precise language of
the Rossi-Berk model provides clear guidance to empirical ap-
plication of the model through the measurement of variation of
normative judgments within each individual, between individu-
als, and among groups of individuals.
6. Applying the model to a normative domain clarifies how
that normative domain is structured relative to other normative
domains.
7. Applying the model to the same normative domain in
many cultures could clarify whether normative structures are
universal or unique to each culture.
8. Applying the model to a large number of normative do-
mains creates the possibility of theorizing about norms at a
higher level of abstraction, by revealing whether all normative
6 Conflict and consensus theorists, of course, do not write about phenomena they
cannot explain from their perspectives. Examples of normative domains that seem
unrelated to society's survival or any group's political interests (and are therefore in-
capable of being explained by either consensus or conflict analysis) might include the
public's preferences for different styles of clothing and varieties of food.
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domains are structured similarly or some domains have unique
structures.
9. The Rossi-Berk model exists outside the structural-
functionalism/conflict debate, but applying the model to spe-
cific normative domains produces empirical findings that can
answer questions raised in that debate.
10. The Rossi-Berk model reconnects the study of crime
and deviance to the field of sociology.7 The study of normative
structures uses the concepts and methods of sociology, and is of
interest to sociologists studying all kinds of human behavior.
II. STUDYING NORMATIW STRUCTURES
A. IMPORTANCE
The shape of normative consensus regarding criminal pun-
ishment has important implications for punishment policy and
the very legitimacy of criminal justice institutions and processes:
"[P]ublic opinion research can provide information about peo-
ple's perceptions of the legitimacy of laws and the institutions
that are designed to uphold, protect, and enforce them."8 At a
deeper level, however, it may be equally important to under-
stand how people formulate their preferences about punish-
ment. What qualities of crimes, offenders, and victims do
people consider relevant to punishment? How do people com-
bine the qualities they consider relevant, leading them to select
a particular punishment? In other words, what norms guide
their choice of punishments?
An understanding of normative behavior is central to most
social science conceptual schemes.9 Norms identify deviant be-
7 The field of sociology is concerned with the structure of social relations, gener-
ally. The deterrence, rational choice, control, and biological theories that are cur-
rently prominent in criminology are not concerned with these broader issues, so
criminological studies applying those theories do not inform the broader field.
8 Stalans & Lurigio, supra note 1, at 371.
See generally Judith Blake & Kingsley Davis, Norms, Values, and Sanctions, in
HANDBOOK OF MODERN SocIOLOGY 456 (Robert E.L. Faris ed., 1964); V. Lee Hamilton
& Steve Rytina, Social Consensus on Norms ofjustice: Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?,
85 AM.J. Soc. 1117 (1980); Robert F. Meier, Norms and the Study of Deviance: A Proposed
Research Strategy, 3 DEVIANT BEHAV. 1 (1981); Terance D. Miethe, Public Consensus on
Crime Seriousness: Normative Structure or Methodological Artifact?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 515
1998]
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havior and, relevant to our concerns, prescribe punishments for
transgressors. The existence of normative standards is indicated
when public opinion is characterized by high degrees of con-
sensus and stability. Knowledge of this normative structure,
however, is complicated by the difficulties associated with identi-
fying empirically stable, enduring public preferences. In par-
ticular, research on norms has been hindered by two issues: how
to measure them, and how to distinguish them from more idio-
syncratic preferences.
B. CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES
As noted above, a growing body of research has emerged on
public attitudes toward the punishment of crime. Although
these studies have provided useful insights about punishment
norms, they have tended to be limited by one or more meth-
odological problems. First, most public opinion polls about
punishment have called for general responses to very complex
questions stated in simple terms.10 They have not evaluated sub-
tleties in judgments. People have been asked, for example: "In
general, do you think the courts in your area deal too harshly,
or not harshly enough with criminals?"" When asked this ques-
tion, 85% of respondents to a 1994 national poll responded
"not harshly enough," revealing general dissatisfaction with
judges' sentencing practices. Respondents were not asked
what they believed such practices to be or what practices they
preferred. This apparent consensus, therefore, reveals neither
respondents' policy preferences nor the norms underlying
those preferences.
This criticism applies in particular to conventional polling
techniques (e.g., Gallup Polls), whose results often are dissemi-
nated widely in the media, strongly influencing policy makers'
(1982); John F. Stolte, The Formation of Justice Norms, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 774 (1987);
Mark Warr et al., Norms, Theories of Punishment, and Publicly Preferred Penalties for Crimes,
24 Soc. Q. 75 (1983) [hereinafter Warr et al., Norms].
" Michael G. Turner et al., Public Tolerance for Community-Based Sanctions, 77 PRISON
J. 6, 6-9 (1997).
" Id. at 7.
2 BuRAu oF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JuSTICE STATIsnCS-1995, at 173 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996)
[hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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understanding of "public opinion." 3 The broad questions
posed in traditional public opinion polls reveal little about
normative structure. Such questions de-contextualize punish-
ment choices from real-life situations where punishment is ap-
plied. They do not simulate actual decision making by people
confronted with real punishment decisions (in the courtroom,
for example), so they cannot reveal the norms guiding those
real decisions. General questions about punishment tend to
elicit very punitive responses characterizing the public's general
fear of crime and dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system,
rather than carefully thought-out punishment preferences ap-
propriate for specific situations.
Indeed, Thomson compares the results of typical public
opinion polls with other types of studies."' Thomson claims that
public opinion polls that provide little information about spe-
cific crimes appeal to fear and outrage, eliciting emotional re-
sponses, much like the reactions of a vigilante mob: "Given
something like the distorted and insufficient information and
visceral incentives of a crowd, they respond something like a
crowd. Hang the criminals. Impeach the judges. Build more
prisons. Hang the criminals."
16
Much academic research, as might be anticipated, is more
sophisticated and more valuable in furnishing information on
punishment norms; but it is not without limitations. Conven-
tional polling techniques have the potential advantage of na-
tional coverage, but with the exception of the National Survey
13 See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRmNALJusncE 293-94 (1997). See also TimothyJ. Flanagan, Public Opinion and Pub-
lic Policy in Criminal Justice, in AMERICANS' VIEW OF CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL
PUBLIC OPINION SuRVEY 151, 152-54 (TimothyJ. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire, eds.,
1996).
" Brandon . Applegate et al., AssessingPublic Support for Three Strikes-and-You're Out
Laws: Global versus Speciftc Attitudes, 42 CRIME & DELNQ. 517, 528-30 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Applegate et al., Assessing Public Support]; Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts,
Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CANADiANJ. BEHAV.
Sci. 269, 277 (1984).
" See generaly Douglas R. Thomson, Discordant Images of Public Sentiments To-
ward Criminal Sanctions (1988) (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Law




of Crime Severity,17 virtually all these studies are based on stu-
dent, community, or at most, state-wide samples.'8 Further, with
few exceptions, 9 many studies do not ask respondents to specify
the actual punishments they would prefer for a given criminal
event. Instead, they use rating tasks-such as response scales
measuring seriousness, general punitiveness, or the fairness of a
punishment meted out-that are one step removed from spe-
cific judgments on concrete sentencing preferences.2
Most important, the standard design used in traditional
academic research-asking respondents to judge the serious-
ness of, or apply punishments to, lengthy lists of criminal of-
fenses-is potentially limited by the core problem found in
conventional polling techniques: decontextualized ratings that
do not approximate decision making in real-life situations.
Thus, respondents are given limited information about a crimi-
nal event-in this case, information that varies primarily along
only two dimensions, the type of crime and degree of harm
caused by the offense.2' As a result, the data produced by this
" See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJuSTICE, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CRaME SE VERriY (1985).
" See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders:
An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 L. & Soc. REv. 223 (1980); Alexis M. Durham, Crime
Seriousness and Punitive Severity: An Assessment of Social Attitudes, 5 JusT. Q. 131 (1988);
Sandra S. Evans & Joseph E. Scott, The Seriousness of Crime Cross Culturally, 22
CRInMNOLOGY39 (1984); Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 9; Peter H. Rossi et al., The Se-
riousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224
(1974) [hereinafter Rossi, et al., Seriousness of Crimes]; Warr et al., Norms, supra note 9.
'9 See, e.g., Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18; L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. & Larry E.
Williams, Understanding Public Support for Punitive Criminal Sanctions: Psychological and
Sociological Vriews of the 'Outlier'Phenomenon, 6 Soc. SPECrRum 179 (1986).
2°See e.g., Francis T. Cullen et al., The Seriousness of Crime Revisited: Are Attitudes To-
ward White-Collar Crime Changing?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 83, 85-87 (1982) [hereinafter Cul-
len et al., Seriousness of Crime Revisited]; Colin Goff & Nancy Nason-Clark, The
Seriousness of Crime in Fredericton, New Brunswick: Perceptions Toward White-Collar Crime,
31 CANADiANJ. CRnINOLOGY 19, 22-24 (1989); Rossi et al., Seriousness of Crimes, supra
note 18, at 227-29; WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
" See, e.g., Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 228; Roland Chilton & Jan De-
Amicas, Overcriminalization and the Measurement of Consensus, 59 SoC. & Soc. RES. 319,
323 (1975); Cullen et al., Seriousness of Crime Revisited, supra note 20, at 88-91; Francis
T. Cullen et al., Dissecting White-Collar Crime: Offense Type and Punitiveness, 9 INT'LJ.
APPLED & CowP. CRiM. JusT. 15, 20-21 (1985); Goff & Nason-Clark, supra note 20, at
29; Darnell F. Hawkins, Perceptions of Punishment for Crime, 1 DEVIANT BEHAV. 193, 198
(1980); Rossi et al., Seriousness of Crimes, supra note 18, at 228-29; Peter G. Sinden, Per-
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research are limited in their ability to illuminate the way people
make real choices about complicated issues, where highly dif-
ferentiated normative structures with conflicting principles are
involved.22
Criminologists have recognized this potential limitation and
have used vignette methodology to provide respondents with a
rating task that approximates more closely the information
available in real-life crime events.2s The first generation of vi-
gnette research, however, was faced with the daunting problem
that varying too many dimensions in the vignette would produce
exponential growth in the number of vignettes respondents
would have to rate. Accordingly, these studies tended to vary
only a few theoretically salient factors (e.g., culpability and
harm) 2
Factorial survey methodology, however, overcomes this
problem by permitting multiple dimensions of a crime event to
vary randomly across vignettes to be rated.2 Although the com-
plexity of real-life crime events can never be duplicated fully,
factorial design vignettes operationalize these events more ade-
ceptions of Crime in Capitalist America: The Question of Conciousness Manipulation, 13 SoC.
Focus 75, 79 (1980); Thomas et al., supra note 2, at 112-13; Winfree & Williams, supra
note 19, at 191-92; WOL.GANGET AL, supra note 17, at 247-50.
' David Indermaur, Public Perceptions of Sentencing in Perth, Western Australia, 20
AUSRALIAN & NEw ZEALANDJ. CRIMINOLoGY 163, 176-80 (1987); Douglas A. Thomson
& Anthony J. Ragona, Popular Moderation versus Governmental Authoritarianism: An In-
teractionist View of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanctions, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
337, 339-41 (1987).
' See, e.g., Brandon 1L Applegate et al., Determinants of Public Punitiveness Toward
Drunk Driving: A Factorial Survey Approach, 13 JUST. Q. 57, 65 (1997) [hereinafter Ap-
plegate et al., Determinants of Punitiveness]; Applegate et al., Assessing Public Suppor su-
pra note 14, at 522-24; Turner et al., supra note 10, at 12-13.
" See, e.g., James Frank et al., Sanctioning Corporate Crime: How Do Business Executives
and the Public Compare?, 13 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 139 (1989) (This study varied the culpa-
bility of the offender and the harm of the offense.); Valerie P. Hans & M. David Er-
mann, Responses to Corporate versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 151
(1989) (This study varied whether the wrongdoing was done by an individual or a
corporation.)
,sPETER H. RossI & STEVEN L. NocK, MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMENTS: THE FACroRIAL
SURVEY APPROACH 16 (1982) [hereinafter Rossi & NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL
JUDGMENTS]; Applegate et al., Determinants of Punitiveness, supra note 23, at 63-64; Joop
J. Hox et al., The Analysis of Factorial Surveys, 19 Soc. METHODS 493, 493-95 (1991);
Turner et al., supra note 10, at 12-13.
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quately and (arguably) introduce less bias into rating tasks, thus
providing a better opportunity for assessing punishment norms.
It is instructive that other criminologists have recognized
the value of the factorial design method in the study of punish-
mentjudgments. As Rossi, Simpson, and Miller note, offenders
may:
be regarded as complex social objects that vary from one another in
many, often contradictory ways-crimes committed, losses or damages
inflicted on victims, and social characteristics of both offenders and vic-
tims. Hence judgments about appropriate punishments for convicted
criminals are a fitting subject for study through the factorial survey ap-
16proach.
To date, a few studies have employed this method to study
punishment preferences, including research on "just punish-
ments" in a Boston SMSA sample,27 on "punishment repertoires"
in American, Japanese, and Russian cities,28 on sources of puni-
tiveness toward drunk driving,29 and on racial bias in support for
capital punishment.0 The most extensive use of factorial survey
design to study punishment preferences was Rossi and Berk's
evaluation of public support for the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion's sentencing guidelines.3 This article reports the results of
26 Peter H. Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness: Fitting the Punishment to the Crime, 1J.
QUAN=rATivE CRimiNoLOGy 59, 62 (1985) [hereinafter Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seri-
ousness].
27 See e.g., JoAnn L. Miller et al., Perceptions offustice: Race and Gender Differences in
Judgments of Appropriate Prison Sentences, 20 L. & Soc'y. REv. 313 (1986) [hereinafter
Miller et al., Perceptions ofJustice];JoAnn L. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial
Survey of Perceived Justice in Criminal Sentencing 82 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396
(1991) [hereinafter Miller et al., Felony Punishments]; Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Serious-
ness, supra note 26.
2See, e.g.,Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Is there a "Common Law" of Responsibil-
ity?, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 277 (1987) [hereinafter Sanders & Hamilton, Common
Law]; Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Legal Cultures and Punishment Repertoires in
Japan, Russia, and the United States, 26 L. & SOCY'. REV. 117 (1992) [hereinafter Sand-
ers & Hamilton, Legal Cultures].
See e.g., Applegate et al., Determinants of Punitiveness, supra note 23, at 57.
See e.g., Brandon K. Applegate et al., Victim-Offender Race and Support for Capital
Punishment: A Factorial Design Approach, 18 AM.J. CRIM. JUST. 95 (1993).
-" PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND
PUBLICVIEWS COMPARED (1997) [hereinafter Rossi & BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS].
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the first national, factorial survey study where respondents rated
crime vignettes by imposing criminal sentences.
Before describing the specific methods used in the present
study, we must first discuss the theoretical framework informing
this study of punishment norms.
III. CLASSIMCATION OF NORMATW STRUCTURES
A. THE ROSSI-BERK MODEL
Rossi and Berk have elaborated criteria to classify normative
structures from survey data.2 In their scheme, norms are de-
fined as statements of obligatory actions or evaluative rules. As
rules governing action, norms specify what should be done in
particular situations (e.g., "serious crimes should be pun-
ished")."3 As evaluative principles, norms state preference or-
ders (e.g., "assault is more serious than larceny") . A normative
domain is defined as the set of norms about a homogeneous
domain of social action." The normative domain addressed in
this paper is punishment for common street crimes. The pres-
ent research reports the first application of the Rossi-Berk
model to the domain of criminal punishment. While the Rossi-
Berk model has previously been applied to the study of crime
seriousness,6 it has not been applied to punishment evaluations.
This analysis of normative structures focuses on the way
three components of norms vary among individuals and be-
tween population groups. The first of these components is
judgments--in this case, the particular punishments selected for
particular crimes. In relation to judgments, the analysis asks,
*1 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 336-44; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 84-100.
"Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 333; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 77-78.
sm WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 17, demonstrate that consensus exists around the
ranking of seriousness of crimes, based on the type of crime and severity of harm.
mRossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 335; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 80.
mSee David Rauma, The Context of Normative Consensus: An Expansion of the Rossi/Berk




What kind of punishment do people want to apply to offenders
who commit particular crimes?
In addressing the conflict-consensus debate about the origin
of law, we especially want to know whether, overall, consensus
exists on the appropriate type and amount of punishment for
each type of crime. From a social policy perspective, we want to
know whether there is sufficient agreement on the kind of pun-
ishment to impose on criminal offenders, so that social policy
could directly reflect "the will of the people" as expressed in
such surveys.
We are also interested in the second component of norms,
called thresholds-in this case we want to know whether people
adhere to some internal scale of punishment severity, and
whether all people use the same scale. In relation to the con-
flict-consensus debate, we want to know whether some sub-
groups of the population (e.g., rich or poor people) use
distinctive scales. If subgroups use their own unique scales, and
if the application of those scales would clearly benefit the sub-
group, we would have strong evidence supporting the conflict
perspective on punishment norms. These questions have im-
portant implications for social policy, as well. If sentencing laws
are to be based on public opinion, there must be widespread
agreement on the appropriate severity of punishment.
The final component of the analysis is error-in this case, er-
ror refers to the dispersion of punishment preferences around
the population mean. If the dispersion is small, representing
relatively minor disagreements about the kind and amount of
punishment, we may claim that substantial consensus exists. If,
on the other hand, there is wide dispersion, no such claim for
consensus could be made, and the mean of punishment prefer-
ences will be an inadequate representation of the will of the
people. Identification of normative domains through surveys is
made difficult by pervasive measurement error. Though nor-
mative order may exist, searching for it with real data is always
confounded by measurement error from several sources. Ran-
dom inconsistencies in judgments of individuals create "noise,"
obscuring any underlying pattern. People, influenced by chang-
ing moods or recent experiences, judge the same situation dif-
256 [Vol. 89
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ferently every time, and different people understand the rating
task differently.
Rossi and Berk specified nine generalized normative struc-
tures, depending on how judgments, thresholds, and error
vary.!7 The first four models all postulate absolute consensus with
varying degrees of measurement error (i.e., everyone makes the
same choice, with no variation in choices, and no structure to
the error).
Model I-Absolute Consensus and Uniformity-Every person
has a perfect understanding of the norms and subscribes to
them to exactly the same degree, without any variation or er-
ror.8 This would describe a situation where every person inde-
pendently chooses exactly the same punishment (e.g.,
execution for all crimes and offenders), without any distinction
among offenses and offenders.
Model 11-Absolute Consensus and Uniformity with Error Only-
As in Model I, everyone subscribes to the norms to ezkactly the
same degree, but there are random variations in responses
caused by different understandings or confusion about the task
or variations in mood. 9
Model III-Absolute Consensus and Differentiated Judgments
with No Error-Respondents perceive that different situations
call for different responses; they all make the same choices
without any random variation." If this model described the
domain of punishment norms, respondents would all agree that
different crimes required different punishments. They would
also agree perfectly on the punishment to impose for every type
of crime (e.g., all misdemeanor thefts should be punished by
one year of probation, all robberies should be punished by five
years in prison).
7 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 336-44; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 84-100.
m Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 337; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 86.
" Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 337-38; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 86-87.
'0 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 338; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 87-88.
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Model IV-Absolute Consensus, Differentiated Judgments and Er-
ror-As in Model III, respondents assign different responses to
different situations, but, though they agree completely in their
judgment of every situation, random variation in responses oc-
curs because of mood changes or misunderstandings.4'
These first four models can be safely ignored because in
modem, complex societies absolute consensus on either gener-
alized norms or specific applications is nonexistent.4 ' Normative
structures in such societies are more complicated; consensus, if
it exists at all, is "relative." That is, people agree on the norms,
but adhere to those norms with different degrees of intensity.
In choosing punishments, for example, people may apply the
same general norm that more serious crimes should be pun-
ished more severely. They come up with different punishments,
however, because they have different "thresholds"-people's
scale of punishments vary, with some people preferring consis-
tently harsher punishments than do other people. Brief de-
scriptions of the remaining Rossi-Berk Models, V through IX, all
of which include relative consensus, are given below.
In Model V-Relative Consensus, Dfferentiated Judgments, Vary-
ing Thresholds, and Error-people do not agree on each judg-
ment, but their disagreement is not random. Each disagrees, by
some constant characteristic of that individual, from the average
rating of the group.43 Rossi and Berk refer to this constant as
the individual's "threshold." Thresholds represent individual
variation in strengths of adherence to norms.
For example, most people would agree that robbery and
burglary should be punished by imprisonment. They might also
agree that robbery should be more harshly punished than bur-
glary (i.e., their punishment judgments are differentiated by of-
fense type). The periods of imprisonment they choose for
41 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 338-39; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 88-89.
42 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 339; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 89.
4' Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 339; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 89.
" Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 339; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 89.
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robbery and burglary vary among individuals. Some variation is
random (i.e., error in judgments exists), but some variation is
systematic: one individual might choose sentences of four and
two years, respectively, for robbery and burglary, while a second
individual might choose sentences of three and one years. The
second individual has a higher punishment "threshold."
Rossi and Berk report several examples of real-world data
that conform to the requirements of Model V (i.e., attitudes to-
ward welfare entitlements and crime seriousness ratings), and
they speculate that most normative domains in modem societies
are best described by Model V.4
In Model VI-Modified Model V, Error Variances Correlated with
Individual Differences-all conditions of Model V apply, but varia-
tion in judgments is related to some characteristic of the raters.
According to this model, identifiable subgroups of the popula-
tion differ on the amount of dispersion around the mean rating
for the subgroup (as would be the case if, for example, there
were greater consensus among women than among men about
the appropriate punishment for a particular crime) .46
In Model VII-Modified Model V, Thresholds Correlated with In-
dividual Characteristics-the conditions of Model V apply, and
thresholds of individuals are consistently correlated with indi-
vidual characteristics. Here, subpopulations are distinguishable
by the strength of their normative preferences (as would be the
case, for example, if men were consistently more punitive than
were women) . Model VII is of particular interest regarding the
conflict-consensus debate. If an identifiable subpopulation were
consistently more punitive than the general population, and if
its greater punitiveness were consistent with the political inter-
ests of that subgroup, such a finding would support the conflict
model of punishment norms.
4' Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 340; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 91.
46 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 340-41; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 92-93.
17 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 341; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Framework,
supra note 4, at 93-94.
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In Model VIII-Segmented Normative Structures: Global Dissen-
sus and Local Consensus-more than one set of beliefs exists
about the norms of a domain. Identifiable subpopulations ad-
here to each set, but aggregating across the entire population
obscures agreement within subgroups.48 This circumstance
would exist if, for example, wealthy people's punishment
choices were guided by entirely different principles than were
poor people's. We might find such a condition if wealthy peo-
ple's punishment choices emphasized the financial harm suf-
fered by crime victims, while poor people gave great weight to
the employment status of offenders.
Finally, in Model IX-Structureless Normative Domains---
normlessness exists. Within such domains choices are random.49
Much consumer behavior (e.g., the volatile enthusiasm for fads
in clothing) and public opinion on policy issues that are not sa-
lient for people are examples of such domains. With regard to
punishment norms, such a condition would exist if people's
punishment preferences were completely unrelated to charac-
teristics of crimes, victims, and offenders.
B. RESEARCH STRATEGY IN RELATION TO PRIOR RESEARCH
This paper is designed to determine whether any of the
Rossi-Berk models of normative structure adequately describes
the normative domain of punishment for common street
crimes. Data reflecting public opinions about punishment were
first collected. Those data were then evaluated to determine
the degree of consensus in public opinion about punishment.
This evaluation was ordered by the progression in normative
structuring hypothesized in the models: First the degree of
overall consensus was determined. Then, where consensus was
found to be relative (to qualities of the offense, offender or re-
spondent), the factors which differentiated judgments were ex-
amined. Punishment thresholds were examined next, followed
by the structure of error.
48 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 341-43; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 94-97.
49 Rossi & Berk, Varieties, supra note 4, at 343-44; Rossi & Berk, Conceptual Frame-
work, supra note 4, at 99.
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Most prior research suggests that punishment norms are
structured according to Rossi and Berk's Model V (Relative Con-
sensus, DifferentiatedJudgments, Varying Thresholds, and Error), but
the evidence is inconsistent. Hamilton and Rytina, for example,
had 391 respondents in the Boston SMSA match hypothetical
crimes with punishments in face-to-face interviews. ° They
found, within individuals, a consistently high correlation be-
tween crime seriousness and punishment severity (e.g., relative
consensus-punishment severity was related to the type of
crime-and differentiated judgments, according to the serious-
ness of the crime) . On the other hand, there was great varia-
tion among individuals on the punishments they preferred for
each offense (e.g., respondents had varying thresholds).52
On the issue of error, Hamilton and Rytina found that
higher-income respondents were more likely than others to
agree with average punishments (a condition of Rossi and
Berk's Model VI, which posits that error variances are correlated
with characteristics of individuals)." Hamilton and Rytina also
found that lower-income and black respondents were "less likely
to exhibit the high within-individual correlations between crime
seriousness and punishment severity which pervaded the data
set."54 This latter finding is somewhat consistent with Rossi and
Berk's Model VIII, under which more than one normative struc-
ture exists, though Hamilton and Rytina did not identify any al-
ternative norms that lower-income and black respondents may
have used in choosing punishments.
In a vignette study similar to the present one, Miller, Rossi,
and Simpson found no differences in the decision rules by
which men and women determine punishments.5 5 Black re-
spondents were, however, slightly more likely than whites to be
'o Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 9, at 1124.
d at 1130.
52 I& at 1132 (The authors did not report summary measures of dispersion for
their entire sample, but did report significant mean dispersion between subgroups.)
53 &
Id. at 1140.
Miller et al., Perceptions ofJustice, supra note 27, at 331.
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influenced by a complex combination of offender and offense
characteristics.56
Sanders and Hamilton searched for segmentation of re-
tributive justice norms among respondents in one U.S. and two
57Japanese cities. They found little evidence that justice norms
were segmented by either sex or educational attainment. 8
There was little difference between men and women, or be-
tween highly-educated and less well educated subjects, with re-
spect to either punishment thresholds (i.e., whether a
hypothetical offender should be punished) or decision norms
(i.e., what punishment the offender should receive).59
Rauma's analysis of crime seriousness, not punishment
norms, closely parallels the present study.6 Rauma included
crime seriousness rating questions in the 1986 Detroit Area
Study.6 1 Each of the 578 respondents rated, on a ten-point scale,
the seriousness of twenty crime vignettes contained in a self-
administered booklet.62 Rauma explicitly tested the compatibil-
ity of his findings with the Rossi-Berk models.
With regard to the decision of what behaviors constitute
crimes, Rauma's findings were consistent with Rossi and Berk's
Model IV; that is, "widely shared norms about what constitutes a
crime that are apparently unaffected by respondent characteris-
tics."63 With regard to the seriousness of crimes, however,
Rauma reported that his findings supported a version of Rossi
and Berk's Model VII; seriousness ratings were correlated with
several respondent characteristics: race, gender, political affilia-
tion, and education.r Respondents who were Whites, Demo-
crats, females, and high school or college graduates gave lower
mean seriousness ratings than did Blacks, Republicans, males,
56 Id.
'7 See generally Sanders & Hamilton, Common Law, supra note 28.
5Id. at 285, 287.
59 Id.
6See Rauma, supra note 36.
1 I at 14.
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and respondents with less than twelve years of education.6
These statistically significant differences between respondent
groups were in the range of 0.7-1.0 on the ten-point scale, or 7-
10% of the seriousness scale range. Whether differences of this
magnitude represent a segmented evaluative structure, as
Rauma suggests, is open to debate.
Rossi and Berk's evaluation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines involved face-to-face interviews with a national prob-
ability sample of representatives of 1737 households." Each re-
spondent chose a preferred punishment for each of forty-two
hypothetical offense vignettes that described violations of fed-
eral laws. The crime types covered by these vignettes included:
drug trafficking, fraud, kidnapping, extortion, forgery, money
laundering, and robbery, as well as violations of firearms, immi-
gration, civil rights, environmental, and tax laws.
Analysis of the present sfudy, guided by these earlier find-
ings, attempts to resolve whether consensus on punishment
norms exists and, ifjudgments are differentiated, the character-




This study is based on thirty-minute telephone interviews
with a national sample of 1920 adults. The interviews were con-
ducted between August and October of 1987. In line with
Zimmerman, et al.,67 we refer to this study as the National Pun-
ishment Survey (NPS).
The interview sample was selected from two computerized
telephone lists. One list was stratified to be representative of all
states, while the other list intensively sampled geographical ar-
eas with high concentrations of minority residents. About 1200
respondents came from the first list and 720 from the second.
Id. at 23.
"Rossi & BErXJUSr PU N ImENTS, supra note 31, at 43.67 Sherwood E. Zimmerman et al., The National Punishment Survey and Public Policy
Consequences, 25J. REs. CP & DEuINQ. 120 (1988).
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The second list was required to obtain a large enough sample of
minority respondents to permit testing the hypothesis suggested
by Rossi and Berk's Model VII: that racial minority group mem-
bers (in particular, Blacks) adhere to a different normative
structure than do Whites. The overall response rate was 43%.6
The interview sample closely approximated the age, in-
come, and regional distribution of the adult U.S. population; it
deviated, however, on sex, race, and educational attainment.
Females were overrepresented in the sample. Blacks and other
non-whites were overrepresented in the sample, due to inten-
tional oversampling of geographical areas with high concentra-
tions of non-whites. Finally, the sample is, on the average,
better educated than the U.S. population, with college educated
people overrepresented and people with less than a high school
diploma underrepresented. To correct for the sex, race, and
education disparities, cases in the sample were weighted on
these three characteristics. 9 The distribution of responses re-
ported below should, therefore, closely approximate the atti-
tudes of a representative cross-section of American adults.
We recognize that nonrespondents' attitudes may differ
from members of the sample who completed interviews. Non-
respondents may have been more or less punitive, for example.
We cannot assess this possibility directly, of course, but it is in-
structive that the results we report on crime seriousness ap-
proximate closely those found by Wolfgang et al. 0 in their
national crime seriousness study. Further, the results of our re-
The MACATI computer program did not permit saving partial responses, so par-
tial response data were lost. Analysis of call records revealed that 6% of all interview
attempts were partially completed-lasting more than three minutes but terminated
before completion-deflating the response rate by 6%. Most nonresponses were re-
fusals given in the first minute of interview attempts. Due to limitations of time and
money, no attempts were made to convert refusals into completions. Achieving a
high response rate also proved difficult for Thomas, Cage, and Foster, who reported a
46.1% response rate to their mailed questionnaire, as well as Blumstein and Cohen,
whose mailed questionnaires were returned by only 24% of respondents. Thomas et
al., supra note 2, at 112; Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 230.
69 Each case was assigned a weight, the inverse of the sampling proportion for cases
in the respondent's sex/race/education group. Every response was multiplied by
that respondent's "weight" in analyses of aggregate responses.
70 See generally WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 1'7.
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search are largely consistent with past studies.7' Accordingly, the
data do not appear to signal any clear way in which nonresponse
may have affected the results reported here.
B. CRIME VIGNETTES
1. Constructing Vignettes.
To assess normative judgments, interviewers read and asked
respondents to rate eight crime vignettes. Each vignette was
constructed by a microcomputer program, through the factorial
survey approach.72 Thirteen "dimensions" were selected to be
included in the vignettes; these dimensions were related to the
type of crime, amount of harm incurred by the victim, offender
characteristics, and victim characteristics. Each dimension var-
ied in its number of "levels." For example, the dimension of of-
fender's sex had two levels (male and female), while the
dimension of offense had twenty-four levels (that is, twenty-four
different crimes).
To construct a given vignette, the computer selected one
level from within each of the thirteen dimensions. Each vi-
gnette is, thus, a unique, random combination of information.
As such, each vignette represents a specific circumstance calling
for the application of the norms concerning the proper pun-
ishment for crime. Respondents, of course, were asked to rate
the vignettes by stating the sentence the offender should re-
ceive. Norms concerning proper punishment are revealed in
the punishments chosen.
A detailed description of the vignette dimensions and levels
is presented in the Appendix. Figure 1 displays a full, sample
vignette, giving an example of each level. •
7, See, e.g., Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 9.




The offender, a twenty-two-year-old male, used a knife to intentionally
injure a victim. The victim, a sixty-year-old female, was treated by a doc-
tor and was hospitalized. The offender had never had a steadyjob. The
offender had a mental condition and was drunk when he committed the
crime. He had never been convicted before for a violent offense, but
had been convicted once before for stealing money or property. He
had served one previous sentence of one year in jail.
Finally, we should note that the construction of the vi-
gnettes deviated slightly from complete randomization; a few
specific combinations of levels were excluded because they
would not typically occur in real life. For example, if the of-
fender's age was fourteen, he or she was not "permitted" to have
a criminal history involving six prior convictions for violent of-
fenses; in forcible rape offenses, only males were permitted to
be offenders and females victims. These deviations from com-
pletely random creation of vignettes introduced low intercorre-
lations among the dimensions.
2. Choosing Vignette Dimensions
The dimensions included in this study are, with few excep-
tions, "legally relevant variables"-characteristics that judges
and parole boards may consider when evaluating a case for sen-
tencing or parole. The primary source for these variables was
the sentencing guidelines and policies established by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission.73 The Commission listed in detail
many additional criteria to be considered as aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that could justify harsher or milder
sanctions, within or outside the guidelines.
The offender's and victim's sex are not legally relevant, ac-
cording to the Sentencing Commission. Sex was included,
however, based on the belief that respondents would find it eas-
73 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMSSMON, SENTENCING GUIDEINs AND POLIGY
STATEMENTS (1987).
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ier to imagine a "male" or "female" rather than a "person"
committing an offense. Including sex of offender may have in-
troduced some random error, as some respondents may have
had difficulty imagining some combinations of offender and of-
fense characteristics.
A finite, manageable list of dimensions must be chosen in
any study of this type. Limiting the range of factors to legally
admissible ones was designed to focus respondents' attention on
characteristics that may legally be manipulated in setting pun-
ishment policy. Extra-legal dimensions (e.g., race and income)
likely influence criminal justice decisions and punishment pref-
erences, but such considerations are beyond the scope of this
study. Pretests of the interview schedule showed that expanding
the number of dimensions (beyond the thirteen used) to in-
clude extra-legal variables would have rendered telephone in-
terviewing unworkable.
The decisions regarding the number of dimensions to in-
clude in each vignette and the number of vignettes to pose to
each respondent were guided by several overarching considera-
tions: Telephone interviewing was selected because it was the
only technique likely to produce a large, national sample of re-
sponses in a short time. Interview length was limited to thirty
minutes both because longer interviews would be difficult to
complete and excessive length would reduce the quality of re-
sponses due to respondent fatigue. Vignettes could have been
very long, including dozens of dimensions, but one very long vi-
gnette would have consumed the entire interview. Pilot testing
revealed that eight vignettes could be completed within the
thirty minute limit if they contained only dimensions composed
of major legally-relevant variables.
A comparison between the NPS and the studies by Rossi and
Rauma points up the strengths and weaknesses of both ap-
proaches. In their self-administered questionnaire booklets,
Rossi, Simpson, and Miller included fifty vignettes constructed
from twenty dimensions. 4 Rauma 5 also used self-administered
4 Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousnes, supra note 26, at 64-66.
Rauma, supra note 36, at 14.
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questionnaire booklets, in which respondents rated twenty vi-
gnettes composed of fourteen dimensions.
Face-to-face interviews permit respondents to rate more vi-
gnettes composed of a few more dimensions. They are ex-
tremely expensive to conduct with widely dispersed samples,
however; so they typically involve geographically restricted sam-
ples. Rossi's respondents all resided in the Boston SMSA, while
Rauma's respondents all lived in the Detroit metropolitan area.
Respondents to the NPS, by contrast, lived all over the U.S. and,
in telephone interviews, each rated eight vignettes composed of
thirteen dimensions.
To permit testing for intra-individual patterns, it would have
been necessary for each respondent to rate at least fifteen vi-
gnettes (two more than the number of dimensions).76 This de-
sign limitation precludes analysis of response patterns within
individual respondents. Consequently, analysis is limited to ag-
gregate response patterns.
C. SELECTING INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In the multivariate analyses, the vignette characteristics
serve as independent variables. In addition, however, informa-
tion was collected on respondent characteristics: age, sex, race,
education, family income, and region (see Table 6 for the cate-
gories within each variable). Furthermore, information was col-
lected on the offense seriousness score given to each vignette-
a procedure that warrants further description.
After being read each vignette, the respondents were asked
to judge the seriousness of the event. The magnitude estima-
tion approach of Sellin and Wolfgang77 was used to measure re-
spondents' perceptions of offense seriousness. This procedure
involved asking respondents to assign numbers representing the
seriousness of offenses relative to a standard offense with a spe-
cific score. That is, after listening to a crime vignette, the re-
spondent was asked, "Vhat number would you give this
situation [we just described] to show how serious you think it is
"'Id. at 17; Peter H. Rossi & Andy B. Anderson, The Factorial Survey Approach: An In-
troduction, in ROSSI & NOCK, MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMENTS, supra note 25, at 26.
THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASURE OF DELINQUENCY (1964).
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compared to the bicycle theft with a score of ten?" This part of
the study replicated much of the methodology of the National
Survey of Crime Severity (NSCS), in which 52,000 people were
surveyed by the Bureau of the Census in 1977 as a one-time
supplement to the National Crime Survey.78 Accordingly, com-
parison of our results with the NSCS is possible, and is pre-
sented later in this paper.79
D. SPECIFYING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NORMATIVE
PUNISHMENTS
After respondents rated the seriousness of a crime vignette,
they were asked a series of questions to determine their pun-
ishment preferences. All the commonly available punish-
ments-jail or prison, probation, fine, restitution, and (for
homicide offenses only) death-were then offered. Respon-
dents were asked which of these punishment types they would
choose for the offender in that crime vignette. If they chose in-
carceration, they were asked whether the time should be served
continuously or periodically and how long the sentence should
be. If they chose a fine, they were asked the amount. Respon-
dents could choose as many of these punishment types as they
wished for each vignette.t
7WOLFGANG ETAL, supra note 17.
7Procedures in the National Punishment Survey differed in several important
ways from the NSCS:
(1) In the NSCS respondents were interviewed mostly face-to-face; in the NPS in-
terviews were conducted by phone. WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 17, at 39.
(2) The NSCS included crime severity questions as part of a victimization survey,
to which many respondents had replied one or more times before; the NPS study of
crime seriousness and punishment preferences did not include questions on victimi-
zation and involved only one contact with each respondent. Id.
(3) In the NSCS only type of offense and amount of loss or harm were given; the
NPS included information about offender and victim. I& at 40.
(4) In the NSCS respondents each rated 21 crimes chosen from 204; each NPS re-
spondent gave opinions about eight offenses chosen from 20, most of which were
taken from the NSCS. Id.
Respondents were also asked a series of questions to elicit the philosophical justi-
fications for their punishment choices for a subsample of vignettes. Analysis of these
justifications is not presented in this paper because the strength of factorial method-
ology is that it permits examination of norms through people's actions (the choices
people make). The justifications people offer for their actions may obscure the
norms actually guiding their choices.
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A logical possibility exists that respondents would differ in
their perception of the severity of the various sanctions. Were
this the case, it would be impossible to determine whether to at-
tribute differences in punishment preferences to differences in
the desired severity of punishment, or to differences in the per-
ception of the severity of punishments. Erickson and Gibbs
have explored whether people perceive the severity of punish-
ments differently I Using a magnitude estimation procedure
similar to the crime seriousness rating procedure employed in
the present study, they had respondents rate the severity of sev-
eral types and amounts of punishment. Erickson and Gibbs
found a high degree of reliability in ratings of punishment se-
verity.82 They also found that police respondents consistently
rated punishments as being more severe than did other citi-
zens. 3 These findings by Erickson and Gibbs provide some re-
assurance that differences in sentencing preferences among
respondents in the present study would be produced largely by
differences in the desired severity of punishment.
V. RESULTS
The analysis presented below is designed to determine
whether any of the Rossi-Berk models of normative structure
adequately describes the normative domain of punishment for
common street crimes. The analysis is therefore organized to
search for consensus on punishment type and amount in the
progressive order hypothesized in the models.
The first set of analyses is guided by Rossi and Berk's Model
V, which hypothesizes, in part, relative consensus and differen-
tiated judgments. The analysis therefore covers the degree of
differentiation (or variability) in punishment type (i.e., impris-
onment, probation or fine) and severity (i.e., length of prison
sentence) based on offense characteristics. Next, the sources of
punishment differentiation are examined. These sources in-
clude offense type, degree of harm, seriousness (as indicated on
8' Maynard L. Erickson &Jack P. Gibbs, On the Severity of Legal Penalties, 70 J. CRIM.
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the Sellin-Wolfang scale), and dollar loss (for property of-
fenses).
The analysis then shifts its focus from offenses to respon-
dents, to determine whether punishment preferences are struc-
tured by characteristics of respondents. Here the most
important question addressed is whether there are identifiable
subgroups of the population that hold distinctive punishment
norms, as suggested by Rossi and Berk's Model VII. Within this
analysis the relative importance of offense and respondent
characteristics are compared.
The final series of analyses examines the structure of disper-
sion or error, to determine whether there are subgroups of re-
spondents who share greater consensus on punishment than
does the general population, as hypothesized by Rossi and
Berk's Model VI, and as Rauma found in evaluations of crime
seriousness.'
A. PUNISHMENT VARIABILIY
Selection of type of punishment shows strong normative
features, with incarceration being chosen overwhelmingly by re-
spondents. Across all twenty-four offense types and all condi-
tions, the most preferred punishment was a jail or prison
sentence, chosen for 71% of vignettes. (Variation by offense
type is described in the next section). Some respondents com-
bined other types of punishment with imprisonment: Probation
was added to imprisonment in 30% of cases, a fine in 24%, and
restitution in 35%. It is clear, however, that these alternatives
were seldom preferred as substitutes for imprisonment. As Ta-
ble I shows, probation was selected as the most severe penalty in
" Rauma, supra note 36, at 25.
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Table 1.
Punishment Preferences Across all Offenses
Punishment Responses That Responses Where This
Type Included This Punishment Was the
Punishment(a') Most Severe Punish-
ment Selected(b)
Percent (n) Percent (n)
Death (c) 34.2% 1,872 34.2% 1,872
Jail or Prison 71.4 14,174 71.4 14,174
Probation 29.8 14,174 16.6 14,174
Fine 24.3 14,174 3.8 14,174
Restitution 35.2 14,174 3.7 14,174
o After they rated the seriousness of the offenses, respondents were read the four
commonly available punishment types in this order Jail or prison, probation, fine,
restitution, and (for homicide offenses only) the death penalty. They were then
asked which of these punishments the offender (if arrested and convicted) should
receive, and told they could choose as many punishment types as they wished.
Where a response included the death penalty, all other punishments were deleted
from the analysis of that response. This column does not add to 100 percent be-
cause many responses included more than one punishment type for each offense.
(b) Punishments were ranked in the following order, from most to least severe: death
penalty, jail or prison, probation, fine, and restitution. Only the most severe pun-
ishment of all those chosen for an offense is reported in this column.
o In these interviews, respondents could choose the death penalty for only three
(homicide) offenses; therefore the percentages presented regarding the death
penalty are for responses about these offenses only. Among all 1,872 responses,
41.8% were "No" and 24.0% were "Don't know."
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only 17% of all cases, a fine in 4% and restitution in 4%.,5
The death penalty was an option for only three of the
twenty-four offense types-homicides associated with assault,
robbery, and forcible rape offenses. Capital punishment was
chosen for 34% of the vignettes depicting homicide offenses.
This figure is low in comparison with current levels of support
for the death penalty as measured by general questions. Some
70% of respondents to a national poll in 1987 (the same year as
the NPS) said they "favor[ed] the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder." " s The homicide offenses included in this
study-committed in the context of a rape, robbery and assault-
may not be typical of all "murders." Rape and robbery homi-
cides do constitute felony murders, however, punishable by
death in many states. The observed lower level of support for
the death penalty for specific offenses is consistent with the
proposition that respondents who are given more detail about a
crime form less punitive judgments.
"'Caution should be exercised in inferring from these aggregate data. One can
only say that for the mix of offenses represented by the 15,360 crime vignettes posed
in this study, in 71% of responses imprisonment was the most severe sanction pre-
ferred. This aggregate percentage reflects responses to the specific mix of criminal
offenses examined in this study. The proportional distribution of types of offenses
among vignettes does not resemble the actual distribution of crimes resulting in con-
viction in U.S. courts.
Comparison of the distribution of offenses in the NPS with the distribution of fel-
ony conviction offenses in U.S. state courts revealed an overrepresentation of the
most serious offenses in the NPS. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTCS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JuSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 1988, at 2 (1990). The authors will fur-
nish this comparison upon request. Zimmerman et al. compared the proportional
distribution of offense types offered in vignettes in the NPS with the actual distribu-
tion of offenses resulting in conviction in New York State. They found the less serious
types of offenses-larceny, harassment and DWI-were underrepresented in the NPS,
while some very serious offenses--murder/manslaughter and DWI resulting in a
death-were overrepresented. Zimmerman et al., supra note 67, at 120.
Though the mix of offense types included in the NPS biases the overall set of re-
sponses toward severe sanctions (i.e., long prison terms), there is ample justification
for this mix. The 24 offense types included represent common street crimes, about
which the public is concerned, and which constitute a substantial proportion of of-
fenses actually processed by the criminal justice system. The included offenses cover
a wide range in seriousness-from larceny of $10 to rape-murder-and a substantial
number of behavioral elements crucial for sentencing-assault, threats, unlawful en-
try, weapon use, theft, drug use, sexual content-to providing the opportunity to ana-
lyze the structure of punishment preferences across this wide range of concerns.
"6 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 12, at 185.
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B. PUNISHMENT TYPE DIEREN ATION
1. Differentiation by Offense Type
There was considerable variability in preferred sanction type
according to type of offense (see Table 2). A majority of re-
spondents favored imprisonment for all offenses, with the ex-
ception of larceny of property worth $10. Imprisonment is
more strongly favored for violent sex offenses than for any other
category of offenses; forcible rape offenses elicited imprison-
ment as the preferred punishment from more than 94% of re-
spondents. Probation was most preferred as an add-on for
cocaine use and the $10 burglary.
Repeating the pattern over all offenses, no alternative to
imprisonment was preferred as the most severe penalty for any
offense (see Table 3). The most popular application of proba-
tion as the most severe sanction was for a $10 larceny (35%),
$10 burglary (33%), and cocaine use (35%). Even in these
cases imprisonment was far more commonly chosen as the most
severe sanction. Fines and restitution did not exceed 20%
(reaching this peak for the $10 larceny) of most severe punish-
ments for any offense.
2. Differentiation by Degree of Harm
Within offense categories, imprisonment was uniformly
more strongly favored for more harmful offenses. For example,
78% favored a prison term for larceny of property worth
$10,000, compared to 55% favoring a prison term for larceny of
property worth $50. This pattern is consistent across all offense
types.
The death penalty, available as an option only for the three
homicide offenses, was most preferred (42%) for forcible rapes
resulting in death, compared to robberies resulting in death
(37%) and fatal assaults (30%).7
"'The same caution applies to the interpretation of these results as to the aggregate
data: Respondents gave their opinions of appropriate punishments in relation to spe-
cific offense descriptions. The distribution of offense characteristics in the vignettes
may not resemble the distribution of characteristics of all offenses of a particular type
(e.g., all homicides) resulting in conviction in the U.S.
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C. SENTENCE LENGTH DIFFERENTATION
1. Differentiation by Offense Type
Incarceration is clearly the preferred punishment for felony
crimes, but there is less consensus over appropriate prison sen-
tence lengths (see Table 4). Clearly, respondents differentiated
between offense types in assigning sentence lengths. The short-
est mean preferred sentence for any offense-burglary of a
building netting $10-was twenty-seven months in prison, with a
median of twelve months. Drunk driving without an accident
received a mean sentence of more than twenty-seven months,
with a median of twelve months.
The longest sentences were for violent assaults resulting in
death. When sentences of "life" and "death" were included (re-
coded as forty-year sentences), mean sentences for the three fa-
tal assaults were between thirty and thirty-five years, with a
median at the forty-year maximum for all three offenses.
2. Differentiation by Degree of Harm
The five larceny crimes differ only in the dollar value of the
amount stolen-$10, $50, $100, $1,000 and $10,000. These five
crimes were compared to ascertain the effect of varying pecuni-
ary harm to victims. Cumulative response distributions of sen-
tence length preferences for larceny crimes are shown in Figure
2. The vertical axis represents the percentage of respondents
choosing lengths at least as long as the sentence lengths repre-
sented on the horizontal axis. Distributions in Figure 2 were
truncated at 180 months to permit examination of detailed dif-
ferences between curves.
Figure 2 shows a set of similarly shaped curves. The curves
representing the higher dollar value thefts are flatter and have
higher means (i.e., respondents chose longer sentences for




All Punishments Selected, by Offense
Punishment Type Selected() (Percent)
Jail or




Larceny of $10,000 -
Car Theft-Sale-$5,000 -
Larceny of $1,000 -
Larceny of $100 -
Larceny of $50 -














81.5% 27.1% 24.3% 39.6%
78.4 28.2 22.3 47.4
72.9 36.1 26.3 59.8
67.7 34.4 17.9 43.9
62.3 33.5 22.4 46.1
55.3 38.8 24.0 49.6
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5.0 5.3 11.6 633
94.7 18.8 19.6 27.0 583
94.1 21.9 19.2 24.1 553
90.6 21.2 29.5 33.6 555













Respondents were read the four commonly available punishment types in
this order: jail or prison, probation, fine, restitution, and (for homicide of-
fenses only) the death penalty. They were then asked which of these pun-
ishments the offender (if arrested and convicted) should receive, and told
they could choose as many punishment types as they wished. Where a re-
sponse included the death penalty, all other punishments were deleted
from the analysis of that response. The rows do not add to 100 percent
because many responses included more than one punishment type for
each offense.
co) The percentage of respondents who selected the death penalty was aver-
aged over only the three (homicide) offenses for which the death penalty




Most Severe Punishment Selected, by Offense
Most Severe Punishment Type Selected() (Percent)
Jail or Fine or
Offense Type Death Prison Probation Restitution Totals(b) n
Property Theft & Damage
Arson-$500,000
Damage - 81.59
Larceny of $10,000 - 78.4
Car Theft-Sale-$5,000 - 72.9
Larceny of $1,000 - 67.7
Larceny of $100 - 62.3
Larceny of $50 - 55.3












o 11.1% 7.4% 100.0% 536
12.8 8.8 100.0 733
19.3 7.8 100.0 603
23.0 9.3 100.0 727
23.0 14.7 100.0 751
29.0 15.7 100.0 768
34.6 19.9 100.1 684
14.4 4.9 100.0 574
32.6 11.0 100.1 530
1.2 0.1 100.1 570
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Jail or Fine or









No Other Injury -



































89.9 7.6 2.5 100.0 565
57.9 35.3 6.8 100.0 481
Total 14,174
The entries in this table represent the most severe penalty chosen among
all the penalties given by each respondent for each offense type.
Some rows do not total 100% due to rounding.
, A total of 15,360 responses were obtained; the remaining 7.7% were re-
corded as "Don't know" or "No" to all punishment types.
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Table 4. Jail or Prison Sentence Length, by Offense
Sentence Length() (Months)
Standard
Mean Median Deviation nOffense Type






















































































Only responses where a jail or prison sentence was selected, and the respondent
chose a specific sentence length, are included here. All sentence lengths over 40
years and all sentences of "life" were recoded to 40 years, which was considered to
be, effectively, a life sentence.
(b) Sentences of "death," available only for the homicide offenses, were recoded to 40



































3. Differentiation by Degree of Seriousness
The offense seriousness magnitude estimation tasks in-
cluded in the National Survey of Crime Severity produced a
classical power function, as shown repeatedly for a wide variety
of physical stimuli. In the NSCS the power function of offense
seriousness ratings for five larcenies had the form:
Y= aX; Y = 21.88 X
0o.2
Where: Y = magnitude of perceived stimulus (seriousness),
a = Y intercept,
X = magnitude of physical stimulus (dollar loss),
b = slope of the function.
A power function also described the relationship between
dollar loss and perceived seriousness of these crimes in the NPS.
This function has the form: Y= 21.5 X °019
Data from both the NSCS and the NPS described above are
plotted on a log/log scale in Figure 3. The two functions have
nearly identical Y-intercepts, though the NPS data have a lower
slope.8 9 The crime seriousness ratings of respondents in the
NPS were less sensitive to increases in dollar value of thefts than
were the ratings of respondents to the earlier NSCS.
This is the first national survey to combine the Sellin-Wolfgang
offense seriousness rating scheme with a measure of preferred
punishment. Respondents gave both an offense seriousness
score and, if they chose a prison term, a preferred length of
confinement. In Table 5 means for these two measures are pre-
sented together by offense type. The arithmetic mean is given
for sentence length, while the geometric mean is given for the
Stanley S. Stevens, On the Psychological Law, 64 PSYCHOL. REv. 153, 162 (1957);
Stanley S. Stevens & E. Galenter, Ratio Scales and Categoy Scales for a Dozen Perceptual
Continua, 54J. EXPERIvMNTAL PSYCH. 377, 409 (1957).
8 9 The NSCS and NPS were conducted ten years apart, during which inflation pro-
duced a 53% devaluation in the value of U.S. dollars, as measured by change in the
Consumer Price Index. The NSCS data were therefore converted to 1987 dollars and
the results compared to the unadjusted figures. This correction did not change the
slope of the function, but only moved the y-intercept down slightly.
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Figure 3.
Seriousness by Dollar Loss : National Punishment Survey
and National Survey of Crime Severity
seriousness score.9O
Offenses were ranked identically on mean sentence length
and seriousness score through the first four offenses. Some
variability appears in the ordering below that, though offenses
with higher average sentence lengths were generally viewed as
more serious.
'0 The geometric mean is defined as the positive nth root of the product of the
numbers, or the antilog of the mean of the sum of the logs. William G. Hines, Geo-
metric Mean, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE STATISTICS SCIENCES 397, 397 (Samuel Kotz &
Norman L Johnson eds., 1983). The geometric mean is the appropriate measure of
central tendency for ratio scale scores. It reduces the effect on the mean of outliers
in very widely dispersed distributions. In this study seriousness ratings were very
widely dispersed-they ranged from 0.3 to 100 billion-because they were presented
to respondents as having no upper or lower limits.
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Table 5. Sentence Length by Offense Seriousness




Only those responses where ajail or prison sentence was selected, and the respon-
dent chose a specific sentence length, are included here. All sentence lengths over
40 years and all sentences of "life" were recoded to 40 years, which was considered
to be, effectively, a life sentence.
(b) Sentences of "death," available only for the homicide offenses, were recoded to 40
years for this analysis.
o Respondents failed to rate the seriousness of 1.9% of vignettes.
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APPLYING THE ROSSI-BERK MODEL
The relationship between mean sentence length and of-
fense seriousness is displayed in Figure 4. The correlation be-
tween sentence length and seriousness (r = .956) underscores
the close correspondence between the two variables. Across
twenty-four offense types, 91.5% of the variation in average sen-
tence length is explained by variation in mean offense serious-
ness.
The close relationship between seriousness and sentence
lengths is attenuated at the individual response level. The cor-
relation between paired seriousness ratings and imprisonment
lengths across all 9997 individual vignettes for which both rat-
ings were recorded is much lower (r = .336). This difference in
magnitude between the two correlations reveals a strong, aggre-
gate, linear relationship between offense seriousness and sen-
tence length; but marked deviations from this pattern exist in
individual pairs of ratings.
The difference between individual vignette correlations and
correlations between aggregated mean ratings indicates the
presence of both considerable error and differing individual
thresholds. Threshold differences represent variations from in-
dividual to individual in their ratings on both scales. Respon-
dents agreed, on average, on the ordering of the twenty-four
crimes in seriousness and deserved sentence length. They did
not agree on the appropriate value for seriousness or sentence
length.91
4. Differentiation by Dollar Loss
This relationship is analogous to the relationship between
dollar loss and offense seriousness. Dollar loss can be consid-
"The error component can be viewed as a function of the rating tasks: Seriousness
is measured by a ratio scale; scores have no common unit of measure (e.g., pound or
inch), they have no upper limit, and they are not additive. Each respondent applied
his/her own set of numbers to the concept "seriousness"; so raw scores varied by
many orders of magnitude (as described above), according to whims of respondents.
Interpretation of a score is clearest when this score is compared directly with other
scores produced similarly by the same respondent. In contrast to offense seriousness,
sentence length is an interval scale; individual scores are additive and have a common




ered an objective stimulus and preferred sentence length inter-
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Figure 4
Sentence Length by Offense Seriousness
Figure 5 shows the linear relationship between logs of dollar
loss and sentence length. Considering only means of these val-
ues (not variation among individuals), r = .9942 (r2 = .989).
Sentence length is a power function of dollar loss. The least
squares regression line for this function has the form:
Y = 25.69 X 
0 .107
Where: Y = mean preferred sentence length in months;
X = dollar loss stated in the vignette.
D. CONSENSUS OR DISSENSUS ON SENTENCE LENGTH
Within each category of offenses-theft, burglary, robbery,
etc. -there is a consistent pattern of more harmful offenses re-
ceiving longer average sentences. Despite this pattern, disper-
sion of sentence preferences among respondents is high.
Medians of sentence lengths are only 27-65% of means for all
crimes except capital offenses. Standard deviations are large.
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100
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Dollar Loss (Log Scale)
F%= 5
Sentence Length by Dollar Loss for Larceny Offenses
Point estimates (means or medians) of public preference
are, therefore, misleading. Point estimates, when used alone,
inaccurately suggest consensus.
Returning to Rossi and Berk's analytical model, characteris-
tics of punishment norms found thus far place this domain
within Rossi and Berk's Model V (relative consensus, differenti-
ated judgments, varying thresholds, and error): People distin-
guish among types of offenses in choosing kinds and amounts of
punishment. They agree on the kinds of punishment appropri-
ate for different offenses. Punishment severity is consistently re-
lated to harm; but people do not agree on the amount of
punishment to be applied for each offense (i.e., people have
different punishment thresholds). Whether punishment
thresholds are patterned by characteristics of respondents (i.e.,
whether Rossi and Berk's Model VI describes the structure of
punishment norms) will be explored below.
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E. PUNISHMENT THRESHOLDS BY RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS
Because of limited interview time, only a few demographic
characteristics were obtained. Differences among respondents
along demographic lines were neither large nor systematic, as
Table 6 shows.
The second column of Table 6 considers only vignettes de-
picting capital crimes. Preferences for the death penalty for
homicides varied significantly by age, sex, education, and family
income, though not in any clear pattern. Males were signifi-
cantly more likely to choose the death penalty than were fe-
males. Differences by race and region were not statistically
significant.
The third column of Table 6 considers all crimes, showing
the percentage of respondents preferring incarceration as a
punishment. The fourth column displays mean incarceration
lengths. Preference levels for imprisonment were significantly
different by age, education, family income, and region. Two
clear patterns emerged: Respondents with the least and most
education, and Westerners, favored imprisonment least. Al-
though a statistically significant difference appeared in sentence
length by age, this difference is not clearly patterned. Sentence
length differences by sex, race, education, family income, and
region were not significant.
F. RESPONSE SENSITIVITY
In the analyses presented up to this point, there is abundant
evidence that the data are both structured and heterogeneous.
At the aggregate level (i.e., average responses), there is con-
siderable structure, but among individual responses there is
considerable variability. How these seemingly uneven charac-
teristics come about can be seen in the analysis presented in this
section. Here the vignette becomes the unit of analysis.
With each rated vignette as a unit, multiple regression
analyses were conducted on sentence lengths. The regressors
were the levels included in the vignettes, each level coded as a
dummy variable, and the demographic characteristics of re-
spondents, also represented as dummies. These analyses, struc-
tured hierarchically (see Table 7), show respondents' sensitivity
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to the various dimensions in choosing sentences, as well as the
importance of demographic characteristics.
Each line in Table 7 refers to a separate regression equa-
tion. The first equation contains only the offense types as
dummy variable regressors. Each successive equation includes
all the independent variables from the preceding equations plus
an additional set of dummies, as indicated. The purpose of the
table is to show how much additional variance is explained by
adding successive sets of information to the model.
In the creation of the crime vignettes, assignment of some
characteristics of offenses and offenders was contingent upon
the prior selection of other characteristics (e.g., information
about the age of the victim was given only for crimes involving
personal injury to a victim). Hence n's for later equations are
reduced under the listwise deletion rule. Because orthogonality
exists among vignette characteristics, collinearity among vi-
gnette dimensions and levels does not confound judgments
about relative sensitivity.92
The most noteworthy feature of Table 7 is that respondents
were most sensitive to offense type. Offense explains 51% of the
variance in sentence length, as shown in Equation 1. Adding
other regressors in later equations adds little explanatory
power-the highest r in the table is 0.60.
The finding that prior criminal record (whether measured
by number of convictions or incarcerations, or length of prior
incarcerations) had little effect on preferred sentence length is
highly relevant to contemporary changes in sentencing statutes
that provide dramatically longer sentences for defendants with
previous convictions. In apparent contrast to these findings is
the work by Finkel and his colleagues, who studied the re-
sponses of college undergraduates to the application of "three
A few pairs of dimensions had collinearity imposed in the design by restrictions
on combinations. Offender's age, for example, had correlations in the .20 range with
number of prior convictions for assaultive offenses and larcenies, and number of
prior incarcerations. Correlations between pairs of dimensions whose combinations
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Selected Death SelectedJail Mean Jail or
for Homicides or Prison' Prison Sentence
































64.85 131 149.6 110
79.58 160 134.8 159
77.10 238 142.3 234
108 77.75 728 136.2 727
74.51 308 138.5 305
73.66 231 122.1 227
66.36 121 118.1 118
75.21 1,920 135.2 1,883
77.74 137 146.8 137
76.48 216 134.1 216
75.30 234 126.4 231
71.14 394 136.2 372
76.35 364 133.6 363
75.69 168 137.5 163
75.71 60 132.6 59
74.93 1,575 134.8 1,543
74.59 347 135.9 345
75.84 545 130.6 544
76.77 707 136.8 703
71.32 318 139.0 290
75.21 1,920 135.2 1,883
The entries in this column are the percentage of each respondent category




Results of Hierarchical Regression on Sentence Length
Equation
Number Variables Added R R2  R2 Added (n)
1 Offense type .7116 .5064 - 10,131")
2 Respondent
Characteristics .7229 .5225 .0161 8,341'b)
3 Prior convictions .7293 .5326 .0101 8,241
4 Offender's age .7329 .5371 .0045 8,241
5 Offense seriousness score .7395 .5468 .0097 8,097"'
6 Offender's employment,
mental illness,
drug/alcohol use .7406 .5484 .0016 8,097
7 Number of prior
incarcerations .7413 .5496 .0012 8,097
8 Length of prior
incarcerations .7420 .5505 .0009 8,097
9 Victim's age .7496 .5619 .0114 3,579'd)
10 Offender's and
victim's sex .7732 .5978 .0359 2,357")
11 Weapon used .7665 .5875 -.0103 946)
Values for the dependent variable (sentence length) were not recorded for vi-
gnettes where the respondent failed to select "jail or prison" or, where the respon-
dent selected jail or prison but failed to choose a specific period of confinement.
(b) Cases were deleted "listwise" in this analysis. Responses where the respondent
failed to give all respondent characteristics were excluded.
Cases were deleted for this and subsequent equations if the respondent failed to
give a seriousness score.
(d) This equation includes only vignettes containing offenses involving personal victims
(i.e., assaults, robberies, and forcible rapes). There were the only offenses where
the victim's age was stated in the vignette.
€ This equation includes only vignettes containing non-sexual assaults and robberies.
These were the only offenses for which the victim's sex was given and varied. The
victim's sex was given as female for all sexual assaults.
0 This equation includes only vignettes containing non-sexual assaults, the only of-
fenses for which the type of weapon was identified.
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strikes" laws to property offenders."3 They found that respon-
dents did favor longer sentences for recidivists, but not sen-
tences as long as many statutes provide: "[Survey subjects] do
not limit their punishment to just the last offense when they
know there were six priors, but neither do they dramatically,
geometrically, or exponentially escalate their punishments be-
cause of priors."94 After reviewing the research literature on
public attitudes toward imposing more severe sentences on re-
cidivists, Roberts concluded:
Public support is probably restricted to recidivist statutes that target of-
fenders convicted of repetitive violent conduct. Recidivist statutes that
result in long-term or indeterminate detention for relatively minor
property crimes (and that accordingly violate the desert-based principle
of proportionality in sentencing) are in all likelihood contrary to com-
munity sentiment.
9 5
Roberts, however, noted that the existing research is flawed.
When only offense type and criminal history information are
provided to experimental subjects, the subjects may interpret
the demand characteristics of the experiment as requiring the
assignment of great weight to the criminal history information.9
Roberts concludes: "[a] less obtrusive methodology... would
necessitate embedding the criminal record within a more com-
plex stimulus array."97 The present study offers such a "less ob-
trusive" method, whereby a broad range of information about
each crime, offender, and victim is provided the subjects, who
must then choose which variables to assign greater weight. The
present experimental conditions would seem likely to yield sub-
stantially lower weightings for criminal record than were found
in the studies reviewed by Roberts, where only the type of crime
" See generally NormanJ. Finkel, et al., Recidivism, Proportionalism, and Individualized
Punishment, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScIENTIrT 474 (1996).
"Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal Record, and the Sentencing Process, 39 AM.






and the criminal record of the offender were provided respon-
dents.
The normative structure of punishment for crimes centers
on the nature of the crime committed, with little response sensi-
tivity to offender or victim characteristics, although the charac-
teristics of victims matter slightly more than do offenders'.
Respondents' demographic characteristics count for little. Lit-
tle evidence exists of either threshold effects structured along
demographic lines or of alternative normative structures. In
short, Rossi and Berk's Model V fits the data best. The structure
of sentence length preference norms is dominated by offense
type.
G. SOURCES OF ERROR
The remaining variation is "error," so far as this analysis can
determine. It is not structured in relation to the respondent or
offense characteristics included in this study. We now turn to
analyses that seek to understand the extent to which that error
is structured.98 To accomplish this we return to the aggregate
level, examining sources of variation in standard deviations
around mean sentence lengths. The objective is to specify
sources of consensus and dissensus in ratings of offense types.
1. Error by Offense Type
Dispersion around mean sentence lengths varied by offense
type. Multiple regression analysis on standard deviations re-
vealed that about 20% of the variation in standard deviations is
accounted for by offense type: disagreement among respon-
dents was greater for some crimes than for others.
99
Within each offense type, much dispersion around the
mean existed. This dispersion was not symmetrical, as shown by
large differences between higher means and lower medians for
all offenses except capital offenses. Most respondents preferred
Miethe has severely criticized previous studies of normative structure, specifically
in relation to crime seriousness, for failing to consider dispersion. Miethe, supra note
9, at 517.
" The standard deviations of sentence length for each offense type are displayed in
Table 4.
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shorter sentences than suggested by the means. Skewness re-
sulted from the very long sentence preferences of a minority of
respondents.10
2. Error by Degree of Harm
Distributions of preferred sentence lengths for the five lar-
ceny offenses, in Figure 2, reveal there was little agreement on
appropriate sentence length for any of the larcenies. Each
curve rises rapidly from the origin, then levels off slowly through
a wide range of sentence lengths, indicating a broad distribu-
tion of responses across the entire range. There is much over-
lap in preferred sentence lengths between offenses. For
example, the median sentence for the most serious ($10,000)
larceny was thirty-six months, but over one-quarter of responses
to the least serious ($10) larceny were higher than thirty-six
months.
Standard deviations increased among property theft and
damage offenses, though not consistently, with amount of dollar
loss. Within other offense categories-burglary, robbery, assault,
forcible rape, drunk driving, and drugs-there are consistently
positive relationships between amount of harm and sentence
dispersion.
3. Error by Respondent Characteistics
Dissensus may be patterned. Some subgroups of people
may agree to the same extent (i.e., may share a norm to the
same degree), as suggested by Rossi and Berk's Model VI. To
test the applicability of Model VI, a multiple regression analysis
was conducted on standard deviations of sentence length. An
aggregated data set was created, with each case being a unique
combination of offense type and offender characteristics. The
independent variables were respondent characteristics and of-
fense types, all coded as dummies. The dependent variable was
the standard deviation of sentence length. In the first model all
'10 This discussion might appear to justify application of the geometric mean to
sentence lengths, as was done with seriousness scores; however, the range of sentence
lengths was only three orders of magnitude (0 - 480 months), while seriousness scores
ranged over 13 orders of magnitude (.3 - 100,000,000,000).
1998]
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variables were included. The resulting multiple R was .458 (R! =
.210). In the second model only respondent characteristics
were included, producing a multiple R of .079 (R2 = .006).
The conclusion of this analysis is that most (21%) of the
identifiable structure in dispersion of preferred sentence
lengths is created by type of offense. Less than 1% of the dis-
persion was accounted for by all respondent characteristics
combined. Though some demographic subgroups have pun-
ishment thresholds different from the general population, no
subgroups were found that have a higher degree of consensus
than the general population has.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to map the underlying nor-
mative structure informing citizens' punishment preferences.
In undertaking this task, we chose to employ a research strategy
that was derived not from theories of law (consensus and con-
flict), but from the sociological study of normative structures
(the Rossi-Berk model). A major advantage of this model is that
it makes no a priori, ideological assumptions about public opin-
ion. Instead, it provides a systematic scheme for assessing a wide
range of possibilities regarding the underlying structure of pun-
ishment preferences. Furthermore, because the model is gen-
eral (i.e., not specific to attitudes about crime or punishment),
it allows future researchers to explore whether the normative
structure of punishment is unique or similar to other normative
domains.
A. THE STRUCTURE OF PUNISHMENT NORMS
The main finding emerging from these the analysis is that
views of the public on punishments for crimes are normatively
structured. The public, however, disagrees about specific levels
of punishments for specific crimes. This lack of consensus ob-
scures the underlying normative structure. Consensus exists on
punishing crimes according to relative degrees of harm, but lit-
tie consensus exists on absolute amounts of punishment. 0' The
101 See also Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 259; Miethe, supra note 9, at 520;
Peter H. Rossi &J. Patrick Henry, Seriousness: A Measure for All Purposes?, in HANDBOOK
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results of this analysis are consistent with Rossi and Berk's
Model V. These data do not support the more stringent condi-
tions of Rossi and Berk's Model VI or VII, because no significant
segmentation of punishment norms by respondent characteris-
tics exists.
The following general conclusions about popular views on
punishment for crime can be drawn from our analysis:
1. Prison is the most preferred punishment
The American public favors imprisonment as punishment
for common street crimes.02 A normative expectation exists, in
short, that most offenders convicted of common street crimes
will be sanctioned by a prison term.
0 3
2. Punishment preferences are differentiated most by offense type
Severity of preferred punishment-for both type of punish-
ment and length of imprisonment-is determined mostly by
type of offense. In turn, the most influential quality of each of-
fense type is its perceived seriousness. This finding replicates
findings by Warr et al.'M and Blumstein & Cohen.05 Relative
consensus exists on the association between punishment and
both objective and subjective measures of harm. This finding is
consistent with that of Thomas et al.,1° who found rank order
correlations exceeding .91 for rankings of punishment severity
by sex, race, age, income, occupational prestige, and education.
OF CRIMINAL JusTIcE EVALUATION 489, 491 (Malcolm W. Klein & Katherine S. Teil-
mann eds. 1980).
' Zimmerman et al., supra note 67, at 130.
See Christopher A. Innes, Recent Public Opinion in the United States Toward Punish-
ment and Corrections, 73 PRISONJ. 220, 227 (1993); Richard C. McCorkle, Punish and
Rehabilitate? Public Attitudes Towards Six Common Cimes 39 CRIME & DELJNQ. 240, 250
(1993); Warr, Public Perceptions, supra note 1, at 49-50. t is possible that support for in-
carceration would have been less pronounced in the NPS if the respondents had
been presented with a wider range of intermediate sanctions as sentencing options.
ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 13, at 212-13. Further, although citizens often prefer
incarceration as a response to crime, their attitudes may be flexible enough to find
non-incarceration as an acceptable, if not preferred, penalty. Turner et al., supra
note 10, at 20-21.
W0 arr et al., Norms, supra note 9, at 88.
,'Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18, at 236.
106 Thomas, et al., supra note 2, at 110-16.
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Prison sentence length preferences vary directly with perceived
offense seriousness and (for larceny offenses) with dollar loss,
according to the laws of psychophysics. Mean preferred sen-
tence length is a power function of both mean perceived seri-
ousness and dollar loss. Tremblay1 7 also reported evidence of a
power function between sentence length and dollar loss.
3. Punishment preferences are influenced little by the characteristics of
offenders and victims
Only offenders with long criminal records impress the pub-
lic as requiring substantially more severe punishment. Very
young offenders are viewed more leniently than are older of-
fenders."" Other factors-such as short records of arrest, convic-
tion, and imprisonment; employment history; drug and alcohol
use; and mental health-are accorded little importance in de-
termining appropriate penalties.
4. Respondents have different punishment thresholds
Some respondents consistently prefer higher and some
lower levels of punishment. Consequently, a wide range of
preferences exists for the punishment of every offense. Unfor-
tunately, the design of the present study, where each respon-
dent rated only eight vignettes, did not permit analysis of the
consistency of these thresholds within individuals. However, in
a similar study where fifty vignette ratings were collected from
each respondent, Rossi et al. found that "respondents' ratings
were internally more consistent than were the pooled ratings."' °
Another way to understand the empirical finding of Rossi and
his colleagues, is that people are consistently "punitive" or "le-
nient"-in Rossi and Berk's terms, they really do have "punish-
ment thresholds."
07 Pierre Tremblay, On Penal Metrics, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRMINoLOGY 225, 237
(1988)
"o8 See Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Support for Correctional Treatment: The Tenacity of
Rehabilitative Ideology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BE-AV. 6, 12, 15 (1990). See alsoJody L. Sundt
et al., The Tenacity of the Rehabilitative Ideal Revisited: Have Attitudes Toward Offender
Treatment Changed?, 25 CRIM.JusT. & BEHAv. 426, 437-38 (1998).
"' Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness, supra note 26, at 88.
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5. No normative segmentation exists
Variability of punishment thresholds does not indicate
normative segmentation of the American public. No demog-
raphically structured segments of the population differ substan-
tially in their punishment preferences!" Small but statistically
significant differences in punishment preferences appeared by
respondents' age, education, income, and geographical region.
These findings are consistent with earlier work by Blumstein &
Cohen,' who found statistically significant differences in pun-
ishment severity preferences by sex and race, as well as differ-
ences between some religious, income, and occupational
groups. Rossi et al." also found comparatively small effects of
demographic characteristics of respondents, accounting for un-
der 5% of the total variance in punishment preferences. Puni-
tiveness thus appears to be more a matter of taste than of status.
Furthermore, differences among respondents are overshadowed
by the much greater differences associated with objective char-
acteristics of offenses.
6. Dissensus about punishment varies by offense type
The extent to which respondents disagree is influenced by
the particular offense being rated: there is greater disagreement
about the punishment for more serious offenses. This dis-
agreement is not patterned by respondents' demographic char-
acteristics. In other words, there is no population subgroup
(identifiable by age, ethnicity, sex, income, or geography) that
has more internal agreement on appropriate punishments than
does the population as a whole.
... This generalization does not exclude the possibility that punishment thresholds
could be structured by other characteristics that were not evaluated.
. See generally Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 18.
1 Rossi et al., Beyond Crime Seriousness, supra note 26, at 81.
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7. American punishment norms are structured according to Rossi and
Berk's Model V-relative consensus, differentiated judgments, varying
thresholds, and error
Punishment norms are characterized by relative consensus,
differentiated judgments, varying thresholds, and error:
(a) "Relative consensus"- People agree on the rank order-
ing of punishments for crimes, with crimes perceived as more
serious deserving harsher punishment. They generally prefer
imprisonment to other types of punishments for all but the
most minor offenses. This consensus is "relative" to their
(widely varying) internal scales of punishment, however. People
do not agree on the specific punishment for specific crimes.
(b) "Differentiated judgments"-People's punishment
choices are not random. Preferred punishments vary in a pat-
terned way, influenced primarily by their perception of the seri-
ousness of offenses, and much less by other legally relevant
characteristics of offenses and offenders.
(c) "Varying thresholds"-People have a wide range of pun-
ishment "thresholds" (i.e., some people are more punitive than
others).
(d) "Error-Wide variations in punishment choices exist,
even within each offense type and for offenses perceived as be-
ing equally serious.
The domain of punishment norms does not satisfy the more
stringent conditions set in Rossi and Berk's Models VI and VII,
where error and thresholds are hypothesized to vary with indi-
vidual characteristics. In short, the normative domain of pun-
ishment for criminal offenses is structured the same as other
normative domains which have been studied. Despite the in-
tensity of people's emotional response to crime, the logic they
use in matching crimes and punishments is structured the same
as the logic they apply to their other concerns.
The evidence of widespread consensus on punishment
norms provided in this study provides a counterpoint to the
widespread disagreement about the appropriate response to a
broad spectrum of social problems. When it comes down to the
normative principles which should guide punishment for crimi-
nal offenders, there is consensus. The preference for incarcera-
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tion as punishment for most offenses narrows the range of pub-
licly acceptable choices considerably. The rank order of pun-
ishment preferences according to crime seriousness further
narrows the range of acceptable punishments.
Rossi and Berk's set of hypothetical normative structures
has proved to be a particularly useful guide to searching for the
level and location of consensus on punishment. We have an-
swered the sequential list of logically related questions implied
by Rossi and Berk's model. In doing so we have systematically
documented the location of consensus and identified the norms
around which this consensus exists.
B. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Rossi and Berk provide a set of hypothetical normative
structures, a way of searching for the level and location of con-
sensus/dissensus on punishment. We have answered the se-
quential list of logically related questions implied by the Rossi-
Berk model and, in turn, have attempted to document the loca-
tion of consensus and identified the norms around which this
consensus exists. The survey data reveal that people want, more
than anything else, for punishment to fit crimes."3 When given
a precisely defined punishment-selection task, people choose a
punishment that is proportional to the perceived seriousness of
the crime. Characteristics of victims and offenders are much
less influential than objective harm or perceived seriousness.
Further, there is a normative preference to sanction offenders
with imprisonment.
These findings have implications for, but do not constitute a
rigorous test of, consensus and conflict theories of criminal jus-
tice. These competing theories do not furnish precise guide-
"s See also Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 9, at 1132.
""Most research on perceptions of crime seriousness treat seriousness as synony-
mous with harm or damage. Crime seriousness has, however, been found by Warr to
consist of two distinct components: "wrongfulness" (i.e., the degree of normative vio-
lation) and "harmfulness" (i.e., the amount of damage to the victim). "Seriousness" is
generally interpreted as wrongfulness when a crime is perceived as being more wrong
than harmful. Seriousness is interpreted as harmfulness when a crime is perceived as
being more harmful than wrong. Mark Warr, What is the Perceived Seriousness of Crimes,
4 CRImtNOLOGXf 795, 821 (1989). The present research did not explore whether re-
spondents applied this distinction.
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lines as to how much consensus or dissensus must exist for a
given perspective to be confirmed. Conflict theory can also
claim that any finding of consensus is really "false conscious-
ness," which, in effect, renders this perspective non-falsiflable
with survey data. Earlier studies focusing exclusively on whether
the public agreed on the specific type or amount of punish-
ment 5 or on the congruence between public preferences and
actual sentencing laws" 6 drew ambiguous conclusions on the
conflict-consensus argument. The results reported here and in
other recent work lend support to consensus theory."7 The pre-
sent study looked underneath the surface-the simple expres-
sions of punishment preferences-and found a coherent
structure to those preferences. The existence of this structure
provides reassurance that the U.S. is not splintered into factions
in relation to an issue as fundamental to governing as punish-
ment for crime. Though members of the public disagree on the
specifics, they agree on the general principles that should guide
government in punishing criminal offenders. Absent in the pat-
terned variation in punishment norms is evidence that any de-
mographically defined population subgroup has a substantially
different punishment threshold (i.e., is more or less punitive),
adheres to a distinctively different set of punishment norms
(i.e., puts unique emphasis on particular characteristics of
crimes, offenders, or victims), or shares a higher degree of con-
sensus about appropriate punishment than does the general
population.18
... See, e.g., Warr et al., Norms, supra note 9.
"6 See, e.g., Warr et al., Contending Theories, supra note 2.
"
7 See e.g., Warr, Public Perceptions, supra note 1, at 49-52.
"a We note one qualification to these findings. The NPS did not measure respon-
dent's religious affiliation, beliefs, or practices, so punishment practices could vary by
religion or religiosity. As Garland notes: "One of the reasons why the influence of re-
ligion upon punishment is so evident [historically] to the observer is that religious
cultural systems are clearly articulated." DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN
SocIETY: A STuDYINSocIALTHEORY 204 (1990). On a general level, Hunter contends
that social science research shows "religion's declining significance as an explanatory
variable. Whether one is a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew simply does not mean very
much when attempting to explain variations in people's attitudes or values." JAMES
DAviSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEnNE AMERICA 105 (1991). If
denomination per se no longer shapes attitudes, however, evidence is increasing that
"potentially consequential divisions" are occurring within denominations between
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We should caution, however, that it is not clear theoretically
why social cleavages in punishment preferences should be ex-
pected. In applying conflict theory, it may be mistaken to ex-
pect that opinion would be splintered on all crime-related
issues; the key consideration is whether group interests are mark-
edly affected by the issue being examined. From this vantage
point, general consensus might be expected about punishment
preferences: Norms favoring proportionality of punishment-as
opposed to discretionary, preferential treatment before the
law-may, if anything, be in the interests of less powerful
groups. Even imprisonment may be viewed as a governmental
resource that provides powerless groups protection against
crime victimization."9
In contrast, public opinion may be more divided by group
status when the issues at stake are not whether punishment
should be proportionate, but whether state power actually is ap-
plied equitably. Thus, research shows clear racial differences in
opinions about the extent of racial discrimination in criminal
"orthodox" and "progressive" members. Id. at 105. The result is the "polarization of
a religiously informed public culture into two relatively distinct moral and ideological
camps. Id. at 106.
Existing criminological research lends some credence to Hunter's view. Several
studies have shown that, although religious denomination is unrelated to attitudes to-
ward crime, religious fundamentalism is positively related to punitiveness. See, e.g.,
Harold G. Grasmick et al., Religious Beliefs and Public Support for the Death Penalty forJu-
veniles and Adults 16J. CRRAE &JUST. 59, 72-73 (1993); Brandon Applegate et al., For-
giveness and Fundamentalism: Reconsidering the Relationship between Correctional
Attitudes and Religion 2 (Mar. 12, 1998) (Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Albuquerque, NM) (on file with the
authors) [hereinafter Applegate et al., Forgiveness and Fundamentalism]. Even so,
the relationship of fundamentalism to punitiveness is not apparent across all studies.
See, e.g., Applegate et al. Determinants of Punitiveness, supra note 23; Marla Sandys &
Edmund F. McGarrell, Beyond the Bible Belt: The Influence (or Lack Thereoj) of Religion on
Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty 20 J. CRImE & JusT. 179, 186 (1997). Finally, some
contradictory evidence exists, indicating that certain religious beliefs--such as belief
in forgiveness--are related to less punitiveness. Applegate, Forgiveness and Funda-
mentalism, supra, at 24. Further research is therefore needed to clarify the extent to
which various dimensions of religious belief systems influence punishment prefer-
ences.
" 'CompareJohn J. DiIulio, Jr., The Question of Black Crime, 117 PUB. INTREST 3, 11-
12, 23-24, 31 (1994), with JEROME MMLER, SEAPcH AND DESTRO. AFRICAN AMERICAN
MALEs iN THE CRMINALJuscE SnSTEM 125-28 (1996).
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punishments20 and about police use of deadly force.12' In any
case, testing the conflict-consensus debate through public opin-
ion is complex and will require more precise propositions about
which attitudinal domains should be marked by social cleavages.
The findings we report also have implications for theories
or justifications of punishment. The pervasive support for the
norm of proportionality-the idea that punishment should fit
the crime-suggests that citizens believe that retribution or "just
deserts" should guide criminal sentencing.12 2 Although this is a
plausible interpretation, two qualifications may apply: First, as
Warr points out, "individuals may invoke seriousness in judging
appropriate punishments for reasons having nothing to do with
retribution. 25 For example, the public may favor longer prison
terms for those committing serious crimes because they perceive
such offenders as being more dangerous, requiring longer peri-
ods of incapacitation to secure public safety.
Second, criminal sanctions are both multi-faceted and are
applied to offenders over long periods. Norms of proportional-
ity or 'just deserts" may guide public views toward core features
of sanctioning, but not on all of its aspects. This may be one
reason why surveys that poll citizens about the goals of punish-
ment or on "what the main emphasis of prisons should be" find
support not only for retribution, but also (and at times more
strongly) for rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence. 24
Similarly, in a factorial vignette study, Applegate reports that, al-
though offense seriousness is inversely related to support for
rehabilitation, this relationship explains only a modest amount
'2 Martha L. Henderson et al., The Impact of Race on Perceptions of Criminal Justice, 25
J. GCRiM.JuST. 447, 453-54 (1997).
121 Francis T. Cullen et al., "Stop or I'll Shoot: " Racial Differences in Support of Police Use
of Deadly Force, 39 AM. BEHAVIORALSCaENT 449, 454-58 (1996).
' Warr, Public Perceptions, supra note 1, at 52.
2 Id.
1 Brandon K. Applegate et al., Public Support for Correctional Treatment: The Continu-
ingAppeal of the Rehabilitative Idea 77 PRISONJ. 237, 244-46 (1997); Cullen et al., supra
note 108, at 10-13; Mark Warr & Mark Stafford, Public Goals of Punishment and Support
for the Death Penalty, 21J. RES. CRIME& DEUNQ. 95,99-102 (1984).
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of the variation in such support125 Accordingly, it may be that
the underlying normative structures of "rehabilitation prefer-
ences" and "punishment preferences" may be different. This is
an area for future research through the application of the Rossi-
Berk model.
Finally, although it seems only a short step from data on
punishment to setting policy, we do not encourage a simplistic
"policy by poll" approach. The sentiments of citizens are not ir-
relevant to setting public policy, but the exact role they should
play is complex and beyond the scope of this article. More rele-
vant here, there is a risk that even sophisticated surveys-never
mind the one- or two-item polls that receive publicity in the me-
dia and are used by politicians-will be misinterpreted.126 Thus,
the willingness of respondents to select very specific sanctions
does not mean that public opinion about punishment is rigidly
fixed. For example, there is no firm consensus on the punish-
ments to impose on convicted offenders. Within the broad
principle that more serious crimes ought to be punished more
severely, for most offenses a broad range of punishments re-
ceives support. Almost any specific punishment will find some
supporters and many opponents. Imprisonment length prefer-
ences are widely dispersed; therefore setting prison terms at the
means or medians of the distribution of preferences would be
inconsistent with the desires of most people. 27
Furthermore, individuals tend to manifest flexibility in their
punishment preferences: they will revise views on crime control
when complexities are introduced into the decision-making
process. The focus group research of Doble and Doble & Klein
reveals, for example, that people will go beyond retribution in
" Brandon KL Applegate et al., Specifying Public Support for Rehabilitation: A
Factorial Survey Approach 197 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Cincinnati) (on file with authors).
" Durham, supra note 18, at 9-10.
'"Greater consensus may exist around ranges of punishment type and severity than
around point estimates. This hypothesis has not been tested. In such a test respon-
dents might be asked, for example, to specify the most and least severe punishments
they could tolerate for given offenses. It remains for future research to determine if




matching punishments to offenders when they know more
about the realities of punishment.28 Their preference for long
prison terms is moderated when they know about the costs and
benefits of prison and alternative sanctions. Similarly, the ex-
perimental research of Doob & Roberts and Stalans & Diamond
also shows that the more people are told about the details of a
particular case, the less punitive they are.129
Building on this last point, there is a risk of confounding
the interrelated but distinct issues of (1) public views on punish-
ing individual offenders and (2) the complex matter of devising
correctional policy. Punishment norms derived from surveys
such as the NPS speak mainly to the issue of what respondents
feel is an appropriate response to individual offenders. Correc-
tional policies, in contrast, reflect not only considerations of
what sanctions specific offenders (e.g., robbery versus homicide
offenders) should receive, but also an array of organizational,
financial, and political factors-such as levels of prison crowd-
ing, funding competing governmental needs (e.g., education),
and evidence of sanction effectiveness. As a result, attempts to
use opinion data to justify specific policy proposals are suspect if
they rely on survey data not designed to address the complexi-
ties of the policy under consideration.
These considerations are not meant to imply that the pun-
ishment norms identified in the NPS and related research are
methodological artifacts and irrelevant to a deeper understand-
ing of American correctional policy. It would be unwise to at-
tempt to translate public opinions directly into correctional
policy. It would be equally unwise, however, to ignore the con-
straining influence of public opinion on public policy discourse
and decision-making. Norms that favor fitting punishments to
crimes, usually with prison sentences, exist as expectations
'2 See generally JOHN DOBLE, CRIME AND PUNISHmENT: THE PuBUIC's VIEW (1987);
JOHN DOBLE & JOSH KLEIN, PRISON OVERCROWDING AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCES: THE
VIEWS OF THE PEOPLE OF ALABAMA (1989).
'2 See Doob & Roberts, supra note 14, at 276; LorettaJ. Stalans & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Biased Recall Effects in Lay Perceptions ofJudicial Leniency in Sentencing
24 (1988) (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Law & Society Association
in Vail, Colorado) (on file with author); see also Applegate et al., Assessing Public Sup-
port, supra note 14, at 528-30.
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whose violation can evoke strong reaction; indeed, the cases of
Willie Horton, Rodney King, and OJ. Simpson illuminate the
salience of these normative expectations. Furthermore, as
Scheingold points out, punishment preferences are political
capital-ubiquitous, if usually quiescent, sentiments-that law-
makers can either brandish against a political opponent or
flaunt while claiming they are dealing with crime by passing yet
another round of "get tough" legislation1SO Accordingly, as-
sessments of the public's views on criminal punishments,
though of limited use for making policy, provide important in-
sights into America's reaction to crime.
"o See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND
PunUc PoUcy 43-45, 54-57 (1984). See also KATHERINE BECEETT, MAKING CRIME PAY:.




OFFENSE VIGNETTE DIMENSIONS AND LEVELS
Vignette Construction Procedures:
In the construction of each vignette, selection was first
made from Dimensions C (Larcenies) or D (All other offenses).
The selection from C or D was retained regardless of the exclu-
sion of combinations of subsequent dimensions and levels, so
that every level in C and D would be contained in equal (1/24)
proportions among all vignettes constructed.
For each respondent, every dimension except Dimensions C
and D was sampled with replacement (i.e. all characteristics, ex-
cept offense type, could be repeated in vignettes posed to a sin-
gle respondent).
Within each dimension, except Dimensions B (Offender's
sex), G (Offender's Employment History), H (Offender's Men-
tal Condition) and I (Drug Dependence and Alcohol Abuse),
every level had an equal probability of being included in every
vignette. The proportionate selection of levels within Dimen-
sions B, G, H and I are specified below.
Some dimensions have a level specified as "BLANK" When
that level was selected for a dimension, no information about
that dimension would be included in the vignette.
Dimension A-Offender's Age
1-The offender, a 14 year old
2-The offender, a 18 year old
3-The offender, a 22 year old
4-The offender, a 28 year old
5-The offender, a 32 year old
6-The offender, a 45 year old
7-The offender, a 65 year old
8-The offender, a
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Dimension C-Offense Set #1 (Larceny Offenses)
1-stole property worth $10 from outside a building.
2-stole property worth $50 from outside a building.
3-stole property worth $100 from outside a building.
4-stole property worth $1,000 from outside a building.
5-stole property worth $10,000 from outside a building.
Dimension D-Offense Set #2 (All Other Offenses)
1-broke into a building and stole property worth $10.
2-broke into a home and stole $1,000.
3-did not have a weapon. He/she threatened to harm a victim
unless the victim gave him money. The victim gave him/her
$10 and was not harmed.
4-threatened a victim with a weapon unless the victim gave
him/her money. The victim gave him/her $10 and was not
harmed.
5-robbed a victim of $1,000 at gunpoint. The victim was
wounded and required hospitalization.
6-robbed a victim at gunpoint. The victim struggled and was
shot to death.
7-[INSERT DIMENSION N] intentionally injure [d] a victim.
As a result, the victim died.
8-[INSERT DIMENSION N] intentionally injure[d] a victim.
The victim was treated by a doctor and was hospitalized.
9-[INSERT DIMENSION N] intentionally injure[d] a victim.
The victim was treated by a doctor but was not hospitalized.
10-intentionally shoved or pushed a victim. No medical
treatment was required.
11-forcibly raped a victim. No other physical injury occurred.




13-forcibly raped a victim and forced her to perform oral sex
on him. No other physical injury occurred.
14-drove his/her car while drunk, but did not cause an acci-
dent.
15--drove his/her car while drunk, and caused a traffic acci-
dent where a victim was killed.
16-stole a car worth $5,000 and sold it.
17-intentionally set fire to a building, causing half a million
dollars worth of damage.
18-sold cocaine to others for resale.
19-used cocaine.
Dimension E-Victim's Age
1-The victim was a 10 year old
2-The victim was a 14 year old
3-The victim was a 20 year old
4-The victim was a 30 year old
5-The victim was a 45 year old
6-The victim was a 60 year old
7-The victim was a 75 year old





Dimension G-Offender's Employment History
1-The offender was unemployed for a long time, even though
he/she had tried hard to get ajob. (10%)
2-The offender has never had a steadyjob. (10%)
3-The offender has held a good-paying job for
several years. (10%)
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Dimension H-Offender's Mental Condition
1-The offender had a serious mental illness. (10%)
2-BLANK (90%)
Dimension I-Drug Dependence and Alcohol Abuse
1-The offender was under the influence of an illegal drug
when he/she committed the offense. (10%)
2-The offense was committed to get money to buy drugs.
(10%)
3-The offender was drunk when he/she committed the
offense. (10%)
4-BLANK (70%)
Dimension J-Offender's Prior Convictions for Assault
1-The offender was never convicted before for a violent of-
fense.
2-The offender was convicted once before for a violent of-
fense.
3-The offender was convicted 3 times before for violent of-
fenses.
4-The offender was convicted 6 times before for violent of-
fenses.
5-BLANK
Dimension K-Offender's Prior Convictions for Property Offenses
1-The offender was never convicted before for stealing money
or property.
2-The offender was convicted once before for stealing money
or property.
3-The offender was convicted 3 times before for stealing
money or property.






1-The offender had never been sentenced to jail or prison be-
fore.
2-The offender had served 1 previous sentence
3-The offender had served 3 previous sentences
4-The offender had served 6 previous sentences
5-BLANK
M-Length of Previous Incarcerations
1-(of or totaling) 6 months in jail.
2-(of or totaling) 1 year in jail.
3-(of or totaling) 3 years in prison.
4-(of or totaling) 5 years in prison.
5-(of or totaling) 10 years in prison.
6-BLANK
Dimension N-Weapon Used in Assaults
1-used a gun to
2-used a knife to
3-used his/her fists to
4-used a lead pipe to
5-BLANK
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